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BEYOND FAIR USE
Gideon Parchomovsky† & Philip J. Weiser††
For centuries, the fair use doctrine has been the main—if not the exclu-
sive—bastion of user rights.  Originating in the English courts of equity, the
doctrine permitted users, under appropriate circumstances, to employ copy-
righted content without the rightsholder’s consent.  In the current digital me-
dia environment, however, the uncertainty that shrouds fair use and the
proliferation of technological protection measures undermine the doctrine
and its role in copyright policy.  Notably, the enactment of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, which prohibits the circumvention of technological pro-
tection measures even for fair use purposes, has diminished the ability of fair
use to counterbalance a copyright owner’s rights in the digital age.
Recognizing the relatively precarious state of the fair use doctrine, many
copyright scholars have rushed to resuscitate the doctrine, offering various
ways to revamp fair use.  As this Article makes clear, these proposals fall
short of the mark.  To address the shortcomings of the fair use doctrine in the
digital age, this Article reconceives the policy challenge and takes a funda-
mentally different tack.  Rather than tinkering with the fair use doctrine, this
Article proposes the creation of a system of new user-privileges that would
supplement fair use.  Specifically, this Article crafts a framework of adaptive
regulation that would cause copyright owners to dramatically increase the
access and use opportunities granted to users.  The framework would achieve
this goal by requiring content owners and distributors to acknowledge user
needs and even compete among themselves over the creation of new user-
liberties.  Such an approach, this Article explains, is superior to rival sugges-
tions and can best assure ongoing technological development and the preser-
vation of user privileges in the digital age.
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INTRODUCTION
Fair use has long been a venerable part of our copyright system.
As one court explained, the doctrine “permits courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”1  Originating
in the English courts of equity, the doctrine operates as an equitable
rule of reason that courts apply on a case-by-case basis.  Over the years,
the doctrine has become a principal counterweight to concerns
rooted in the proprietary control of content by copyright holders.  As
such, it has captured the hearts and minds of generations of scholars,
sparking extensive writings and generating considerable controversy.
One overriding concern and controversy related to fair use is
whether the doctrine can successfully accomplish its purpose—
namely, to balance our copyright system.  A threshold issue in this
1 Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.
1980).
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regard concerns the fuzziness of fair use.  In particular, the fair use
doctrine requires courts and users to engage in a complex mul-
tivariate analysis whose result is nearly impossible to predict.  Com-
pounding this problem is the fact that courts generally keep the
doctrine as vague as possible and decline to provide a formula for
what constitutes fair use.  Given that courts use such an open-ended
analysis, their failure to converge on a shared understanding of what
constitutes fair use is unsurprising.
While some judges and scholars view the open-ended nature of
the fair use inquiry as a virtue, a growing number of theorists view it as
a fatal flaw.  Notably, the ambiguity and uncertainty that shroud fair
use have led to a dramatic underutilization of the doctrine.  Unsure
about the doctrine’s precise contours and fearing the drastic sanctions
that courts impose on copyright infringers, users of copyrighted con-
tent rationally elect either to secure a license from copyright owners
when the cost of doing so is reasonable2 or to forego the use of copy-
righted content altogether when transaction costs are prohibitive.3  In
short, even during the best of times, the fair use doctrine has fallen
short of its designated goal of facilitating creativity for users of copy-
righted content.
The second problem plaguing the fair use doctrine is that, sadly,
the best of times are long gone.4  The golden era of fair use—if one
ever existed—ended about a decade ago with the enactment of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).5  This legislation prohib-
ited users from circumventing technological protection measures
(TPMs) employed by rightsholders to control access to their works.6
Furthermore, the legislation famously banned the production and
provision of circumvention technologies.7  Taken together, these two
prohibitions changed the traditional balance between rightsholders
and users.  As is clear from the legislative history, Congress made a
conscious decision not to recognize fair use as a defense in circumven-
2 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 907 (2007).
3 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1497–1500 (2007).
4 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Keynote: Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 903, 906 (2005) (discussing the popular conception “that fair use is dead”); see also
Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millennium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 193, 193–95 (2000) (discussing the death of copyright in the context of the pre-
dicted deaths of other areas of law); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital
Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 814
(2001) (arguing that “[c]opyright is dead”).
5 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 17 U.S.C.).
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006).
7 See id. § 1201(b).
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tion cases.8  In so doing, Congress significantly limited the scope of
fair use for copyrighted works in digital media; notably, Congress did
not grant users fair use privileges for TPM-protected content.9
Copyright scholars have offered solutions to both problems out-
lined above.  One group of scholars has proposed various mechanisms
for alleviating some of the uncertainty surrounding the fair use doc-
trine.  Michael Carroll, for example, has suggested establishing a spe-
cial “Fair Use Board” that would issue rulings on the fairness of uses
before they are actually taken.10  In the same spirit, Jason Mazzone has
proposed establishing a special regulatory agency to promulgate rules
to govern which uses are fair in specific contexts.11
Another group of scholars has focused its attention on the second
challenge to fair use: the anticircumvention provisions in the
DMCA.12  Decrying the effect of the ban on fair use, some commenta-
tors have justified self-help strategies that defeat TPMs and have
pressed for a reform of the DMCA.  Most notably, Julie Cohen has
argued for the recognition of a “right to hack”13 TPMs to the extent
necessary to engage in fair uses.14
We find all of these above-mentioned proposals laudable in many
respects, and we agree that fair use is an important component of our
copyright system.  Yet—and here we critically differ with the extant
literature—we submit that the proposals to reform fair use and the
proposals to reform the DMCA do not adequately respond to the
ongoing erosion of user privileges.  For reasons we will explain, many
of the relevant proposals represent a marginal improvement over the
existing state of affairs.  None of these proposals (or any combination
8 See infra note 52 and accompanying text. R
9 For an example of how this limitation plays out in practice, consider the impact of
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).  In that case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that users must make do with fair
uses of analog content where a TPM denies access to any digital fair use opportunities. See
id. at 459.  Notably, because all content will eventually be available in digital form, the
Corley doctrine is unsustainable over the long term and illustrates the potential for the
narrowing of the fair use doctrine over time.
10 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090–91 (2007).
11 See Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 415–19
(2009).
12 See, e.g., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: TEN YEARS UNDER
THE DMCA 6–9 (2008), http://www.eff.org/files/DMCAUnintended10.pdf [hereinafter
EFF REPORT].
13 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1089, 1141 (1998).
14 See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Man-
agement,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 531–32 (1998) (“I have argued that the law should not
prohibit consumers from circumventing digital CMS to defend privileges traditionally af-
forded under the public law of copyright, and that federal copyright law and policy instead
should be interpreted affirmatively to authorize such conduct.”).
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of them), however, strike the optimal balance between the interests of
rightsholders on the one hand and users on the other.
A fundamental flaw of the existing proposals concerns their prac-
ticability.  In particular, implementing these proposals requires an
openness to undoing some of the DMCA’s core premises that is cur-
rently wanting.  Indeed, Congress is unlikely to reverse its chosen pol-
icy strategy and establish broad exceptions to the anticircumvention
provisions in the face of widespread opposition from the content in-
dustries.  Congress is equally unlikely to choose to overhaul the fair
use doctrine that the courts have shaped since time immemorial.
Most importantly, perhaps, we argue that fair use alone cannot, and
should not, provide the sole policy tool available to policymakers in the
digital age.  In short, the nature of fair use as a rule of reason that
requires ad hoc analysis imposes an insurmountable limitation on the
usefulness of fair use as a policy tool, particularly in today’s digital-
networked environment.
Instead of attempting to reform fair use, this Article departs from
the existing scholarly literature and presents a radically different pol-
icy strategy.  In particular, we argue that the fair use doctrine must be
supplemented with a system of what we call “use privileges” or “user
privileges”—i.e., privileges that will dramatically increase the range of
permissible uses of copyrighted content in digital media.  To this end,
we propose a system of adaptive regulation that, over time, will lead to
the development of a broad range of privileged uses.
Our proposed strategy builds on an ongoing yet largely unno-
ticed dynamic that has developed in the digital realm: many owners
and distributors of digital content have chosen, of their own accord,
to expand user privileges.  Furthermore, they have developed innova-
tive approaches for granting users access to content, reflecting, as the
examples discussed herein make clear, more than some quirk of a few
firms acting against interest.  Rather, this dynamic represents a ra-
tional, self-interested response of firms to market pressures (i.e., con-
sumer demand for access opportunities).  From the standpoint of
copyright policy analysis, therefore, the behavior of these firms consti-
tutes a real-world experiment that can provide valuable guidance as to
the formulation of user privileges in the future.
By reconceptualizing the terms of the debate over fair use and
emphasizing the importance of user privileges, we explain how a re-
gime of adaptive regulation promises to reverse what Yochai Benkler
has called the “enclosure movement” of placing increasing content
under digital locks.15  To this end, we develop a two-step regulatory
15 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclo-
sure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 354–55, 412 (1999).
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regime to encourage copyright owners to expand use privileges with
respect to their proprietary content.  The first step requires content
owners to offer users a set of access and use privileges and to publicize
them.  In particular, we recommend that Congress mandate content
owners to adopt some measures to facilitate access to and use of digital
content (as opposed to requiring content owners to adopt a particular
form of accommodation).  By issuing such a broad and open-ended
decree, Congress can allow multiple standards to emerge over time
and compete against one another in the marketplace.  Given current
marketplace conditions, competition among content providers—cou-
pled with pressure from illegal downloads and content-sharing plat-
forms (such as creative commons and the open-source movement)—
is reasonably likely to result in a much greater accommodation of user
needs than we presently see.
To spur more competition and to ensure that consumers are in-
formed of user privileges, our proposed regulatory regime would re-
quire content owners to provide clear and explicit notification of the
substance and the scope of the privileges they afford to users.16  By
insisting on a clearly understood and articulated notification require-
ment, this regime would empower users to make informed choices
and catalyze self-regulatory forces.  Among other things, this regime, if
properly implemented, could spur the use of “Web 2.0” technology17
as a means of enabling users to report on and aggregate information
about the actual conduct of digital content owners and distributors.
To ensure that firms disclose user privileges accurately and effectively,
this Article recommends that Congress authorize the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to ensure compliance with the proposed disclo-
sure requirement.
The first step of the policy proposal developed in this Article is
hardly guaranteed to succeed.  Consequently, should the strategy out-
lined above fail to generate a satisfactory level of access to digital con-
tent, Congress must be ready and willing to implement a second
strategy of specifying use privileges that content owners must provide.
16 This requirement would, in effect, operate along the lines of nutrition product-
labeling information: content providers would need to specify clearly and notoriously what
limits and freedoms they offer to users with respect to fair use opportunities.  Notably,
rather than specify the precise scope and nature of the access privileges, Congress would
leave the nature and extent of such privileges to the discretion of the various content
owners or distributors of digital content.
17 “Web 2.0” refers to the development of tools and technologies that enable users to
produce content that other users can aggregate and consume.  The proliferation of blogs,
the popularity of Facebook, and the emergence of Twitter are all examples of the signifi-
cance of Web 2.0 technology.  For the classic definition of the term by the person who
coined it, see Tim O’Reilly, What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next
Generation of Software, O’REILLY (Sept. 30, 2005), http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-
web-20.html.
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Because the first strategy is less intrusive to the market and promises
to lay the groundwork for the second strategy (should it be necessary),
Congress should not begin with this second strategy.  Notably, the
market experimentation that takes place under the first strategy
would inform the form and substance of the user privileges that the
second strategy requires.  In particular, use measures and technolo-
gies adopted by firms that craft their own rules concerning use privi-
leges would inform Congress as to what approaches are practicable.
Moreover, if the content industry is concerned about the possibility of
more intrusive regulation under the second step, it will be more likely
to take its obligations under the initial regime seriously, making the
first strategy more likely to succeed and more worthy of a first attempt.
In short, even if competition falls short of yielding adequate access to
digital media, implementing the first proposal will provide tremen-
dously valuable information to policymakers and will demonstrate
that, even with clear notice of the importance of addressing this issue,
the industry is unable to do so without more binding forms of
regulation.
In sum, this supply-side approach has four main advantages over
rival demand-side (e.g., right to hack) proposals.  First, it has signifi-
cant potential to bring about greater and improved access opportuni-
ties to content via competition and experimentation.  Second, it holds
a great promise of creating increased certainty for users as to how they
can use digital content, and the proposal will empower users to be-
come more sophisticated purchasers of digital content.  By contrast,
demand-side solutions, by and large, relegate users to a life of uncer-
tainty, requiring them to determine whether their planned uses fall
within the aegis of the current fair use doctrine—a nearly impossible
task given the doctrine’s vagueness.  Third, our approach has the ad-
vantage of being more attainable because it entails both lower legisla-
tive and adjudicative costs than rival proposals.  In particular, we
believe that the FTC—which has already begun to oversee and ad-
dress deceptive and unfair practices with regard to digital rights-
management systems—is well equipped to oversee such a regime.  Fi-
nally, demand-side models, especially the right to hack proposal, are
likely to generate an ongoing and inefficient arms race, whereby con-
tent owners adopt increasingly sophisticated TPMs and users employ
increasingly sophisticated hacking techniques.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  In Part I, we discuss the cur-
rent state of digital copyright law, highlighting the polarized debate
over fair use.  In Part II, we survey the access privileges that content
providers have voluntarily adopted to allow certain uses of copy-
righted content.  In Part III, we set forth our normative proposal for
creating user privileges in the digital world, explaining how it would
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operate and the role of the FTC in its implementation.  A short con-
clusion follows Part III.
I
THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE IN A DIGITAL WORLD
The future of fair use continues to spark debates in the academy,
Congress, and the courts.  Even in the analog world, the concept of
fair use provoked considerable controversy and was regularly criti-
cized for lacking any well-defined structure.18  In particular, critics ar-
gued that judicial implementation of the doctrine “has resulted in it
growing increasingly unpredictable,” and despite a number of aca-
demic efforts to develop a tractable standard, an increasing number of
commentators agree that “it is now virtually impossible to predict the
outcome of fair use cases.”19  The advent of digital technology, which
facilitates massive copying, has led copyright holders to question the
wisdom of addressing infringement concerns (and fair use defenses)
after the fact.  It has also given rise to new lines of debate, with some
insisting that TPMs provide necessary front-end protection (even
against possible fair uses) and others complaining that TPMs infringe
on users’ freedom and stifle fair use.20
This Part sets the stage for the debates over fair use by discussing
its origins and common law development.  It then examines the
DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions,21 which prohibit circumven-
tion technologies when they facilitate fair uses.  Notably, this Part dis-
cusses how the DMCA arguably gives “copyright owners an absolute
veto over any fair uses of their works”22 and has sparked a series of
legal arguments that the courts and Congress have not yet resolved.
Finally, this Part engages the scholarly debate, evaluating a number of
proposals aimed at protecting fair use in the digital age.
18 To be fair to Congress and the courts, the fair use doctrine’s commitment to a
vague standard and case-by-case decision making was intentional and grounded on the
theory that clearer rules and principles would emerge over time. See Parchomovsky &
Goldman, supra note 3, at 1496. R
19 Id.
20 Compare David Kravets, Universal Says DMCA Takedown Notice Can Ignore ‘Fair Use,’
WIRED (July 18, 2008, 1:46 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/07/universal-
says (reporting Universal Music’s position in litigation that DMCA permits it to require a
website to remove a posting with its copyrighted material regardless of whether the posting
was a fair use), with EFF REPORT, supra note 12, at 14 (“As an increasing number of copy- R
right works are wrapped in technological protection measures, it is likely that the DMCA’s
anti-circumvention provisions will be applied in further unforeseen contexts, hindering
the legitimate activities of innovators, researchers, the press, and the public at large.”).
21 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
22 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 3, at 1489–90. R
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A. Fair Use and Uncertainty
English courts of equity originally fashioned the fair use doctrine
over two and a half centuries ago.23  The courts intended to create a
sphere in which users could utilize copyrighted works without authori-
zation from copyright owners.  In the United States, Justice Joseph
Story famously introduced the principle in Folsom v. Marsh,24 a case
involving rival biographies of George Washington.  In an oft-cited par-
agraph that became the basis of the modern formulation of fair use,
Justice Story wrote:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to
the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects,
of the original work.25
Over time, the courts refined the considerations that Justice Story
listed, and in 1976, Congress codified the fair use doctrine.  Following
precedent, Congress “refrained from [specifically] defining fair use or
articulating a clear test of fairness.  Instead, it provided a nonexhaus-
tive list of illustrative uses—such as comment, criticism, scholarship,
research, news reporting, and teaching—that may qualify as fair.”26
Moreover, Congress set forth four nonexclusive factors for courts to
consider when deciding whether a particular use is fair.27  As any stu-
dent of the field knows, these factors are (1) the use’s purpose and
character, including its commercial or nonprofit nature; (2) “the na-
ture of the copyrighted work”; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the reproduced parts in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the impact of the use on “the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.”28
In the Copyright Act of 1976, “Congress provided no guidance as
to how to measure these factors against one another, whether all [of
the factors] must be satisfied for a finding of fair use,” or how to rec-
oncile conflicts among the factors.29  Instead, it simply instructed
courts that “each case raising the question must be decided on its own
facts.”30  Over time, the Supreme Court has attempted to provide
23 See, e.g., Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.) 490 (introducing the con-
cept of “fair abridgment”).
24 See 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
25 Id. at 348.
26 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 3, at 1495; see also Gideon Parchomovsky, R
Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY 347, 352–53 (1997) (discussing
interpretive problems that arise from the text of the statute).
27 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 3, at 1495. R
28 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
29 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 3, at 1496. R
30 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
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some structure to the otherwise open-ended analysis.  At one point, it
focused on providing latitude to noncommercial actors;31 more re-
cently, however, the touchstone inquiry has become whether individu-
als use protected works in a “transformative” fashion.32
Notwithstanding these efforts, the fair use doctrine has decidedly re-
mained an “equitable rule of reason,” with all of its attendant
uncertainty.33
The uncertainty that surrounds fair use comes at a high cost: “law
and economics scholars have long observed that vague standards
cause overdeterrence.”34  The standard’s vagueness prevents actors
from discerning the optimal behavior that the law requires of them.35
Thus, “actors [generally] find it in their best interest to err on the side
of safety and . . . overcomply (by minimizing the use of protected
works) or overinvest in precautions.”36  Concretely, users who exceed
the permissible level of copying expose themselves to full liability
under the Copyright Act.  Hence, they will always prefer to take less
than what they perceive to be the permissible amount and will be shel-
tered from liability.
Several factors aggravate the problem of overdeterrence in the
copyright context.  First, expressive works invariably generate spil-
lovers (or positive externalities) due to their public-good characteris-
tics.37  As a result, individuals using copyrighted material “cannot
capture the full benefit of the use but stand to bear the full cost if
sued.”38  “Second, the Copyright Act provides a wide array of remedies
to copyright owners, including injunctions and supercompensatory
damages.”39  Notably, courts can order the impounding of infringing
articles,40 allow plaintiffs the defendants’ profits,41 or award statutory
damages of up to $150,000 per infringement if the infringement is
31 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
(“[A]lthough every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair ex-
ploitation[,] . . . if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood [for harm] must be
demonstrated [to support an infringement claim].”).
32 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579–85 (1994); cf. Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring) (not-
ing that Borland’s commercial appeal lay not in its copying of Lotus’s computer spread-
sheet menu but in Borland’s added features).
33 Sony, 464 U.S. at 448.
34 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 3, at 1497–98. R
35 Id. at 1498.
36 Id.
37 Id.; see also, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and
the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1016–33 (2003) (explaining why right-
sholders cannot fully appropriate copyrighted information and assessing what this fact im-
plies for policymaking).
38 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 3, at 1498. R
39 Id.
40 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2006).
41 Id. § 504(b).
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deemed willful.42  Thus, the expected cost that unauthorized users
face is likely to far exceed the expected benefit, which in many cases
will be quite modest.43  Due to this disparity between expected cost
and expected benefit, users are generally wary about making fair use
of works.44
For users attempting to protect against the uncertainty of fair use,
securing a license from a rightsholder is their only alternative to stop-
ping their use of copyrighted content.45  Licensing, however, has nu-
merous problems:
Professor James Gibson demonstrates how the vagueness of intellec-
tual property doctrines, including fair use, forces users to secure
licenses even when they do not necessarily need to do so and how
this dynamic enables rightsholders to expand their rights at the ex-
pense of users and the [general] public.
Additionally, securing an unnecessary license is a wasteful ex-
penditure of resources that could be directed to other, more crea-
tive, ends.  The purpose of fair use, after all, is to spare users from
these costs by giving them the privilege to use some protected ex-
pression for free.46
B. Digital Technology and Its Challenge to Fair Use
Uncertainty is not the only problem plaguing fair use.  The fair
use doctrine developed in an analog world.  In that environment, cop-
yright owners relied on the nature of the technological environ-
ment—where copying creative works led to degraded copies and
where the distribution of such works was costly—as an important form
of protection.  In the digital-networked environment that the Internet
fuels, both forms of technological protection—the degradation of
copies and the relatively high distribution costs (e.g., selling pirated
VCR cassettes on a street corner)—came undone.  For the recording
industry, the new paradigm and existential threat to its business
model was the advent of Napster, which used the ability of digital tech-
nology to make perfect copies and used the Internet as a distribution
outlet to lay the seeds of destruction for the industry’s legacy business
model.47  For the content industry, this threat was dubbed “the digital
42 Id. § 504(c)(2).  If the infringement is not willful, a plaintiff can collect a maximum
amount of $30,000. Id. § 504(c)(1).
43 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 3, at 1498. R
44 See id.
45 Id. at 1499.
46 Id. at 1498–99; see Gibson, supra note 2, at 887–95. R
47 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2001)
(describing Napster’s “peer-to-peer” Internet music file-sharing service).
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dilemma”48 in the mid- to late-1990s and remains a vexing challenge
today.
Confronted with this existential threat, the content industries re-
sponded by using both technological and legal means.  Two principal
tactics merit discussion here.  First, the industry began to employ a
myriad of TPMs to render illegal copying of content more difficult
and less cost effective.  Indeed, the use of one form of TPM—encryp-
tion—has become ubiquitous: content owners regularly encrypt
DVDs, CDs, and downloadable files to prevent their duplication.49
Second, the content industries have pushed for legal measures to bol-
ster the effectiveness of TPMs.  Mindful of the fact that TPMs can be
“hacked,” content owners called on Congress to pass legislation that
bars the circumvention of TPMs (sometimes called copy-protection
systems).  In 1998, Congress responded to such requests by enacting
the DMCA, which bans the creation, use, marketing, and trafficking of
circumvention technologies.50
To ensure that TPMs were effective in preventing copyright in-
fringement, the DMCA created civil and criminal penalties for their
circumvention.51  Although Congress specified several exceptions to
the circumvention and trafficking bans that the DMCA imposed, it did
not include fair use among them, showing “relative indifference” to
the issue.52  Despite the omission of fair use from the exception list,
some hoped that courts would construe the DMCA as implicitly pro-
viding a fair use exception.53
The first and most important fair use case under the DMCA
dashed the hopes of those who believed that there was a fair use prin-
48 See COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMA-
TION AGE 1–2 (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/digital_dilemma/exec_
summ.html.
49 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 3, at 1521.  In some cases, content owners R
implement extreme security measures to ensure that individuals cannot copy their materi-
als. See, e.g., Joe Morgenstern, The Screens Have Eyes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2005, at P3
(describing movie studios’ enhanced security efforts to prevent movie critics from pirating
films prior to public release).
50 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1) (2006).
51 See id. § 1201; cf. Sharon R. King, Consumers Still Seem Resistant to Some New High-End
Electronics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at C1 (“[C]opy-protection issues are keeping some
studios from offering some of the hottest titles [in DVD format].”).
52 Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public
Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 1004 (2007)
(noting that the lobbying clout of those concerned about DMCA’s anticircumvention pro-
visions was limited and that “deployment of TPMs to protect copyrighted works was in its
early stages, so concerns about impediments to fair and other privileged uses may have
seemed speculative”).
53 There was also some hope that the Librarian of Congress’s procedure for excep-
tions might address troublesome uses of TPMs.  That hope, however, overlooked the limits
of this procedure. See id. at 1006–08.
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ciple embedded in the DMCA.  In particular, Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Corley involved the Content Scrambling System (CSS) used by the
motion picture industry to prevent hackers from copying DVDs.54  In
that case, a noted hacker—Jon Johansen, now known as DVD Jon—
developed a program, DeCSS, for decrypting CSS-protected DVDs.55
Johansen contended that he developed DeCSS as a means of enabling
a DVD player to operate on a Linux operating system.56  After he cre-
ated the software, however, a number of websites posted the decryp-
tion program, thereby enabling users to circumvent DVDs’ TPM and
use DVD content for whatever purpose they saw fit.57
One website that posted the code was 2600.com, operated by Eric
Corley.58  As Corley explained during trial, his decision to post the
code was motivated by the fact that “[w]riting about DeCSS without
including the DeCSS code would have been . . . analogous to printing
a story about a picture and not printing the picture.”59  In reaction to
Corley’s posting of DeCSS, the motion picture industry sued him
under the DMCA, alleging that he violated the law’s “anti-trafficking”
provision,60 which bans any efforts to distribute circumvention
technology.61
Corley’s principal defense was that his distribution of the DeCSS
program was a privileged use because he shared Johansen’s goal of
enabling DVDs to be played on a Linux machine and that this pur-
pose constituted a fair use under copyright law and was protected by
the First Amendment.62  The district court, noting that the DMCA did
not permit the use of circumvention technology to enable fair uses,
ruled against Corley and stated that “[i]f Congress had meant the fair
use defense to apply to [anticircumvention cases], it would have said
so.”63  Moreover, the district court (as well as the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals) remarked that the nature of digital technology—
the fact that it allows mass copying and distribution before the copy-
right holder can take protective action—justified preventing copying
before it takes place.64  As for the claim that the denial of a fair use
54 273 F.3d 429, 435–37 (2d Cir. 2001).
55 Id. at 437.
56 Id.
57 See id. at 438–39.
58 Id. at 439.
59 Id. (quotations omitted).
60 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006).
61 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 435.
62 See id. at 436.
63 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
64 To that end, the Second Circuit quoted the district court’s reasoning:
There was a time when copyright infringement could be dealt with
quite adequately by focusing on the infringing act.  If someone wished to
make and sell high quality but unauthorized copies of a copyrighted book,
for example, the infringer needed a printing press.  The copyright holder,
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right violated the First Amendment, both the district court and Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support
a showing that a lack of access to DeCSS prevented users from acces-
sing content for legitimate purposes.65  To support this conclusion,
the Second Circuit explained that “[w]e know of no authority for the
proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less
the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in
the identical format of the original.”66  In effect, the Second Circuit
concluded that the availability of traditional analog forms of copy-
ing—including a video recording of a movie played on a television
set—provides a sufficient fair use opportunity and obviates the need
for any direct access to digital content protected by the DMCA.67
In enacting the DMCA, Congress moved quickly to address the
concerns of the content industry and did not focus on the potential
for cases like Corley to restrict the scope of the fair use doctrine in the
digital age.  Fearful that broad exceptions might allow increased cir-
cumvention to occur, Congress provided only limited exceptions to
the DMCA.  Thus, to those in the content industry, the fair use claim
advanced in Corley underscored the need for the DMCA in the first
place.
In the wake of Corley and other high-profile DMCA cases, such as
the RIAA’s threatened prosecution of Princeton computer science
Professor Ed Felten for publishing a scholarly paper discussing the
encryption technology that the RIAA’s Secure Digital Music Initiative
utilizes,68 many commentators and some policymakers grew more
concerned about the potentially overbroad scope of the DMCA and its
ability to chill legitimate and, in some cases, constitutionally protected
speech.69  Fueled by such criticism, Congressman Rick Boucher has
once aware of the appearance of infringing copies, usually was able to trace
the copies up the chain of distribution, find and prosecute the infringer,
and shut off the infringement at the source.
In principle, the digital world is very different.  Once a decryption pro-
gram like DeCSS is written, it quickly can be sent all over the world.  Every
recipient is capable not only of decrypting and perfectly copying plaintiffs’
copyrighted DVDs, but also of retransmitting perfect copies of DeCSS and
thus enabling every recipient to do the same.  They likewise are capable of
transmitting perfect copies of the decrypted DVD.  The process potentially
is exponential rather than linear.
Corley, 273 F.3d at 452 (quoting Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 331).
65 Id. at 459 (quoting Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 338 n.246).
66 Id.
67 See id.
68 For a discussion of the Ed Felten case, see Cassandra Imfeld, Playing Fair with Fair
Use?  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Impact on Encryption Researchers and Academicians, 8
COMM. L. &  POL’Y 111, 136–43 (2003).
69 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. E19–20 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Boucher) (“Given the breadth of the [DMCA] and its application so far, the fair use rights
of the public at large clearly are at risk.”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within
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pushed for an exception to the DMCA, concluding that the DMCA
“tilt[s] the balance in our copyright laws too heavily in favor of the
interests of copyright owners and undermine[s] the longstanding fair
use rights of information consumers.”70  In particular, he introduced
the Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 200571 to create a fair use
exception to the DMCA and to make clear that “it is not a violation of
this section to circumvent a technological measure in order to obtain
access to the work for purposes of making noninfringing use of the
work.”72  When that bill failed to gain traction in Congress, Represen-
tative Boucher sponsored the Freedom and Innovation Revitalizing
U.S. Entrepreneurship Act of 2007, which protected a set of uses from
liability and limited statutory damages to cases where “no reasonable
person could have believed [the] conduct to be lawful.”73  Likewise,
this bill failed to garner significant congressional support.
Given that the Supreme Court has yet to interpret the DMCA, the
DMCA’s exact scope remains up for debate.  Indeed, in decisions in-
volving efforts to use the DMCA to prevent competition in the
“aftermarket” context, some courts have interpreted the DMCA in a
manner more hospitable to fair use concerns than did the Second
Circuit in Corley.74  In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies,
Inc.,75 for example, the Federal Circuit ruled that Skylink, a garage-
door-opener manufacturer, did not violate the DMCA when it manu-
factured a universal remote that bypassed the security feature of
Chamberlain-made garage doors and allowed the user to open such
doors without Chamberlain equipment.76  In rejecting Chamberlain’s
DMCA claim against Skylink, the court highlighted that Skylink did
not intend to infringe Chamberlain’s copyrights in the system’s code
by circumventing the security feature but to interoperate with it.77
Notably, unlike the Second Circuit, which lacked interest in evaluat-
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 80–81 (2001) (discussing how the DMCA “is
highly vulnerable to facial First Amendment challenge”); see also Dan L. Burk & Julie E.
Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 52
(2001) (“In some instances of overreaching via technological controls, the Constitution
may even demand a limited self-help right, or ‘right to hack’ . . . .”); cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (referring to the fair use doctrine as providing “built-in First
Amendment accommodations”).
70 149 CONG. REC. E19 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2003) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
71 H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
72 Id. § 5(b)(1).
73 H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess. 2007).
74 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Temptations of the Walled Garden: Digital Rights Manage-
ment and Mobile Phone Carriers, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 77, 91–92 (2007) (dis-
cussing how “courts have repeatedly found ways to hold that the DMCA does not apply to
protect exclusivity in aftermarkets for consumer goods in which manufacturers have em-
bedded computer code”).
75 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
76 Id. at 1203–04.
77 Id. at 1197.
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ing the context of the use, the Federal Circuit concluded that circum-
vention does not violate the DMCA if it is done within the user’s
prerogative to utilize a product he or she purchased and not to in-
fringe copyrights.78  In a later case, the Federal Circuit elaborated on
its view that the DMCA seeks to reinforce the Copyright Act, stating
“[t]o the extent that [the copyright holder’s] rights under copyright
law are not at risk, the DMCA does not create a new source of
liability.”79
C. Scholarly Proposals and Their Shortcomings
The enactment of the DMCA prompted an outcry among legal
scholars.  Notably, several leading commentators have expressed grave
concern about the future of fair use, decrying the diminished applica-
bility of the doctrine.80  Similarly, a number of commentators have
harshly criticized the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions, arguing
that these provisions enable content owners to eliminate certain forms
of fair use at will.81  Concerned over the impact of the DMCA, some
commentators have even argued that “fair use is dead.”82
Academic criticism of the DMCA has spurred a series of reform
proposals for ensuring fair use in the digital era.  In this Subpart, we
review those proposals, evaluating each in turn.  In so doing, we un-
derscore their limitations and lay the intellectual groundwork for the
approach we propose in Part III.
1. The Right to Hack
Of the various proposals designed to resuscitate fair use, Julie Co-
hen advanced perhaps the most provocative one.  In particular, Co-
hen argues that the use of TPMs by content owners, together with the
DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions, restricts users’ traditional privi-
leges and threatens their First Amendments rights.  To address this
problem, Cohen recommends that users be granted the “right to hack
the digital code that implements and enforces the challenged restric-
78 See id. at 1203–04.
79 Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307,
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
80 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 69, at 79–81. R
81 See, e.g., EFF REPORT, supra note 12, at 1 (“[T]he DMCA grants to copyright owners R
the power to unilaterally eliminate the public’s fair use rights.”); Burk & Cohen, supra note
69, at 50–51 (asserting that the DMCA effectively “allow[s] every copyright owner to cus- R
tom-design its own version of copyright law”).
82 See Gordon, supra note 4, at 906, 909 (describing the claim as “common” though R
ultimately concluding that “[w]hile fair use is in danger from the DMCA and develop-
ments in contract law, I am not yet prepared to pronounce fair use to be dead”).
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tion.”83  Cohen’s argument is predicated on the view that the tradi-
tional copyright balance between owners’ rights and users’ privileges
sets an immutable legal baseline that content owners may not change
either contractually or by the use of code.  The same is true, a fortiori,
for users’ First Amendment rights.  Accordingly, any attempt by con-
tent owners to unilaterally erode privileged uses or restrict speech
rights via the use of TPMs amounts to a violation of the law, entitling
users to employ self-help measures to remove the incursion on their
rights.  Cohen defends her proposal on the principle that public law
(the Copyright Act and the First Amendment) is supreme to private
law (contract and code).  In short, Cohen suggests, any attempts to
change public law privately by restrictive technological measures justi-
fies the employment of countermeasures that nullify the purported
change.
Cohen’s view finds some support in a number of cases.  Notably,
the Federal Circuit recognized a limited right to circumvent TPM in
two cases.  In these cases, the copyright holder attempted to use the
DMCA not to protect its copyright but rather to prevent competition
in the aftermarket of related services.84  In Chamberlain, for example,
the court rejected Chamberlain’s suit because Skylink circumvented
the code feature not to infringe Chamberlain’s copyrights in the sys-
tem’s code but to interoperate with it.85
Cohen’s proposal to give users the “right to hack” has a powerful
intuitive appeal.  After all, it is difficult to justify why users should not
be allowed to circumvent TPMs that limit the use of content that the
rightsholder illegally denied them access to in the first place.  The key
shortcoming of this proposal, however, is that it is likely to be either
underinclusive or overbroad in practice and thus unlikely to provide
an effective or viable policy response.  Moreover, it also risks inviting
an ongoing cat-and-mouse game whereby rights owners and hackers
are—under the color of law—engaging in a constant and wasteful ef-
fort to develop and hack new TPMs.
Despite the claims of some commentators that everyone on the
Internet can be an effective hacker,86 only a relatively small group of
83 Cohen, supra note 13; see also Burk & Cohen, supra note 69, at 52 (“In some in- R
stances of overreaching via technological controls, the Constitution may even demand a
limited self-help right, or ‘right to hack’ . . . .”).
84 See Storage Tech., 421 F.3d at 1318; Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc.,
381 F.3d 1178, 1203–04 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Netanel, supra note 74, at 91–94 (summa- R
rizing the line of cases).
85 See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1197.
86 See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the
Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 635, 641 (2004) (“[O]nce a sophisticated user has broken the ‘digital lock’ and ex-
tracted the content, there is no ‘speed bump’ impeding subsequent unsophisticated users
from gaining unauthorized access.”).
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consumers have the know-how to circumvent TPMs on their own.87
(Consider, for example, that despite the availability of DeCSS, most
purchasers of DVDs have not taken advantage of the circumvention
technology.)  Consequently, to ensure that this right is conferred
more broadly, it may require the authorization of manufacturing, traf-
ficking, and distribution of circumvention tools (to the extent that
they are sold) to enable fair uses.  Yet, the recognition of such an ex-
emption is highly unlikely and problematic from the point of view of
the content industry because it is impossible to allow the manufacture
of circumvention devices for fair use only.  In practice, an authoriza-
tion to manufacture, traffic, and distribute circumvention devices may
enable a large number of consumers to circumvent TPMs in many
cases unconnected to any fair use.  Consequently, the right to hack
risks either providing an illusory right (i.e., a right that is only availa-
ble to skilled hackers) or narrowing the prohibition on providing cir-
cumvention tools to such a degree that it might well render any effort
to protect TPMs altogether futile.
2. A “Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime”
Professors Jerome Reichman, Graeme Dinwoodie, and Pamela
Samuelson advance a different solution to the fair use challenge, call-
ing for the establishment of a “reverse notice and takedown regime.”88
Their proposed regime would allow users who wish to make a nonin-
fringing use of TPM-protected material to notify the content owner of
their intention to circumvent the TPM for this purpose.  Following
such a notice, the proposal gives copyright owners fourteen days ei-
ther to object to the circumvention or to allow it by inaction, without
prejudice.  In the case of an objection, the regime would entitle the
users to seek a declaratory judgment of their entitlement to bypass the
TPM.
These professors’ proposal seeks to level the rights of content
owners and users by allowing users to utilize the “notice and take-
down” tool, which is available to copyright owners under a different
provision of the DMCA.89  Certainly, the practicality of this model
could be enhanced if the proposal established standardized proce-
dures regarding the required notice and provided for expeditious,
low-cost administrative tribunals.  Yet, even without these mechanisms
in place, this proposal could be applied on a case-by-case basis.90
87 See Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1327, 1330 (2008) (“Most Internet users are unsophisticated, exercising limited power
and finding themselves restricted by technological constraints . . . .”).
88 See Reichman et al., supra note 52, at 987, 1032–33. R
89 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
90 See Reichman et al., supra note 52, at 1033. R
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Despite this possibility, the principal shortcomings of the reverse
notice and takedown proposal are its transaction costs and uncer-
tainty.  First consider transaction costs.  As experience with the
DMCA’s notice and takedown regime indicates, the implementation
of a mirror-image regime (i.e., a reverse notice and takedown regime)
would introduce significant transaction costs.91  In particular, the re-
gime would require users to locate the relevant rightsholder, contact
him or her, and justify their request to secure permission.92  Although
the cost involved is not enormous, it may be high enough to thwart
many low-value fair uses.  It is important to recall that the leading
theoretical justification of fair use focuses on its ability to overcome
the presence of high transaction costs by obviating the need for nego-
tiations between the parties.  Indeed, this ability is the main virtue of
fair use according to Wendy Gordon’s landmark conception of the
doctrine.93  The reverse notice and takedown model would thus risk
stripping fair use of its main virtue by requiring parties to negotiate
prior to the use of protected materials.94  As a result, under the re-
verse notice and takedown regime, fair use may not be available pre-
cisely in those cases where it is most socially desirable: when
transaction costs are prohibitive.
The risk of managing uncertainty is an even greater problem.
Under this proposal, copyright owners could simply deny users per-
mission to use copyrighted content.  As already explained, fair use is a
notoriously murky doctrine.  Thus, copyright owners would almost al-
ways be able to generate a reason, or at least a pretext, to object to the
requested use.  In these instances, the user has the option of seeking a
declaratory judgment against the content owner, but this option is
both costly and time consuming because “split courts, reversed deci-
sions, and inconsistent opinions” mar fair use jurisprudence.95
91 See id. at 1037 n.290.
92 See id.
93 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1618 (1982).
94 We acknowledge that, by the terms of the proposal, negotiation would constitute
an additional safeguard and, in theory, leave users no worse off than the status quo ante in
terms of their ability to implement fair uses without first seeking permission.  But this sug-
gestion ignores the very real—and perhaps likely—possibility that the introduction of such
a procedure would spur a concomitant expectation by courts that users avail themselves of
this option. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,
1384, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that the availability of a clearing mechanism for ob-
taining permission to make photocopies used in course packets was a basis for showing
harm under the fair use inquiry); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913,
930–31 (2d Cir. 1994) (reasoning that the existence of a workable market for corporate
photocopying centers to pay a licensing fee to copyright holders militates against a finding
of fair use).
95 Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 3, at 1496; see also Parchomovsky, supra note R
26, at 348 n.7 (demonstrating this point by reviewing case law). R
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The reverse notice and takedown model may also be most effec-
tive if circumvention tools are available on the market.  Otherwise,
users will be unable to access protected expressions even when the
rightsholder does not object.96  As noted, most users do not possess
the requisite technological expertise to overcome the defensive mea-
sures that protect copyrighted expressions.97  Hence, implementation
of the reverse notice and takedown proposal will operate most effec-
tively in the face of a significant relaxation of the antitrafficking ban.
Such a relaxation, however, would defeat the purpose Congress had in
mind when enacting the DMCA; with circumvention technologies
available on the market, all users, not just fair users, will be able to get
around TPMs.  The availability of circumvention technologies will also
weaken users’ incentives to notify copyright owners about their desire
to use copyrighted content.  Given the small probability of detection
and legal sanction, many users may choose to avoid the cost of con-
tacting the rightsholders.  Instead, they will elect to proceed unilater-
ally and put the material to the planned use.  Hence, permitting the
marketing of circumvention technologies will largely reinstate the
state of affairs that preceded the enactment of the anticircumvention
provisions of the DMCA.
3. The Creation of an Administrative Agency to Oversee Fair Use
A third solution suggested by some scholars is to institute a spe-
cial administrative body to tackle the challenge of determining what
constitutes a fair use.  Michael Carroll, for example, has called for es-
tablishing a “Fair Use Board” within the Copyright Office that would
be authorized to rule on the fairness of various uses.98  With such a
board in place, users could petition the board to opine on their
planned use, thereby receiving immunity from liability in cases where
the board rules in their favor.
Jason Mazzone espouses a somewhat different approach, seeking
to improve upon Carroll’s proposal.99  Mazzone calls for the establish-
ment of a special administrative agency to regulate fair use, contem-
plating two possible models of regulation.  In the first model, the
agency would promulgate regulations that address what constitutes
fair use in specific contexts.100  The agency would be responsible for
preventing efforts by content owners to impede fair uses of their con-
tent.  In the second model, which constitutes an extension of the first,
96 Alternatively, users would be able to use materials only in cases where the right-
sholder fully cooperates with the users’ requests and instructs them on how to get around
the relevant TPM.
97 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. R
98 Carroll, supra note 10, at 1090. R
99 See Mazzone, supra note 11. R
100 Id. at 415–18.
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the agency would not only be charged with promulgating fair use reg-
ulations but also would be required to determine whether the putative
defendant’s use is fair prior to the commencement of any infringe-
ment suit.101
Both Carroll’s and Mazzone’s proposals raise several concerns.
The most obvious problem is their cost.  In particular, two types of
costs must be taken into account.  First, there is the fixed cost of set-
ting up the review body—be it a board within the copyright office or
an independent administrative organization.  Second, there is the cost
of the actual review.  As for the set-up cost, it bears emphasis that es-
tablishing a new administrative agency typically involves lengthy politi-
cal battles, accompanied by extensive lobbying efforts.  The copyright
context is no exception.
The second type of cost is even more daunting.  Given that fair
use is the most common defense to infringement suits, review requests
may overwhelm the administrative body.  The experience of the
Patent Office is instructive.  In 2008, the average pendency time of
patent applications was just over thirty-two months, and the number
of applications pending before the patent office was approximately
1,200,000.102  While examining a patent application undoubtedly
takes longer—an average of eighteen hours per application103—than
making a fair use determination, the volume of fair use review peti-
tions could far exceed the number of patent applications.  Also, given
the vagueness of the fair use doctrine, the agency is unlikely to hand
down fair use determinations quickly.  Accordingly, the proposed re-
view process may prove costly and time consuming.  As a result, it will
create a drag on the creative process and will be completely useless for
users who need to use copyrighted materials expeditiously.
Mazzone’s first model (but not the second) avoids the delay prob-
lem but only at the price of generating a potentially greater problem.
To be sure, the model’s call for general fair use rules or standards is,
in theory, a good idea.  In practice, however, it will meet several diffi-
cult challenges.  Setting aside the question of whether adopting regu-
lations that define fair use with the level of precision necessary to
implement Mazzone’s proposal is desirable,104 the content and the
101 Id. at 419–21.
102 Gene Quinn, USPTO Backlog: Patent Pendency Out of Control, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 22,
2009, 7:43 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/04/22/uspto-backlog-patent-pen-
dency-out-of-control/id=2848/.
103 Mark Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and the Patent Grant Rate
6 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 369,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1329091.
104 For an argument that fair use should remain vague, see Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules
for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 140 (1999) (“[F]air use appears to be employed in
situations of high transaction costs, where a muddy entitlement may be appropri-
ate . . . [because the vague] fair use [standard] allows courts to reallocate what the market
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basis for drafting the regulations is unclear.  As we already noted, the
case law in this area does not provide a coherent body of law on which
to base a comprehensive regulation.105  Worse yet, very little agree-
ment exists as to what fair use means in many different contexts.
The prevailing disagreement as to the meaning of fair use does
not bode well for Mazzone’s proposal.  In particular, past experience
in the area of copyright law underscores that implementation of even
small-scale changes is impossible in the absence of judicial guidance
or real-world benchmarks.  Consider the case of the compulsory li-
cense rates for digital performances of sound recordings.  In 1995,
Congress recognized a new exclusive copyright: the digital perform-
ance right in sound recordings.106  Webcasters, fearing that this new
right spelled doom for their business, opposed its recognition.  To al-
leviate the webcasters’ concerns, Congress, in what seemed to be a
reasonable compromise, established a compulsory royalty arrange-
ment, which called for the parties to engage in voluntary negotiations
to determine the precise amounts of royalty payments.  What ensued
surprised many in the copyright world: failing to reach an agreement
on royalty rates, copyright owners and webcasters engaged in a pro-
tracted political battle lasting over a decade.107  It is entirely possi-
ble—and indeed likely—that similar battles would occur in the fair
use context.
Public choice theory explains another problem with relying on
administrative agencies.  Despite its benign label, public choice theory
explains how and why agencies set up to regulate a certain industry or
economic sector will sometimes act to advance the narrow interests of
the regulated industry or sector.108  This problem is omnipresent, and
there are reasons to believe that it is especially acute in the intellectual
cannot.”); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 256, 257 (1995) (noting that, in some cases, “bargaining may be more efficient under
a blurry balancing test than under a certain rule”).
105 See supra text accompanying notes 54–67 & 74–79. R
106 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
107 For a discussion of this battle, see Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property
or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 827–29 (2007).
108 For a succinct discussion of public choice theory, see Pierre Lemieux, The Public
Choice Revolution, REGULATION, Fall 2004, at 22, 22, 27.  In a vivid illustration of how busi-
nesses can view government regulation as an aid to their ambitions, and not an impedi-
ment, consider what Richard Olney, a former railroad lawyer and Grover Cleveland’s
Attorney General, told his former clients when they asked him for assistance in killing off
the newly created Interstate Commerce Commission:
“The Commission . . . is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads.
It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of the rail-
roads, at the same time that that supervision is almost entirely nominal.
Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be
found to take the business and railroad view of things. . . . The part of
wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.”
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property context.  As Professor Jessica Litman has demonstrated per-
suasively, the content industry exercises enormous influence over the
legislative process, leading Congress to pass unbalanced legislation
that favors the interests of the content industry over that of the public
at large.109  There is no reason to believe that the content industry will
not similarly influence an administrative body established to regulate
it.  Consequently, establishing an agency to regulate fair use may re-
sult in a net social loss, draining public resources without providing
any meaningful offsetting benefits.
* * *
Reflecting on the three proposals outlined above, we must em-
phasize that each has considerable merit and addresses a pressing
concern in a creative fashion.  Yet, each has considerable imperfec-
tions, and these imperfections may prevent their adoption or may not
fully protect fair use if adopted.  As we make clear in Part III, this
Article proposes to move beyond the often all-consuming focus on the
fair use doctrine and seeks to focus instead on the role of user privi-
leges in the digital age.  While we share our colleagues’ concern for
the future of fair use, we believe a markedly different strategy is neces-
sary to advance its underlying policy concern.
Each of the proposals outlined above is premised on a model of
content-industry behavior that suggests (either implicitly or explicitly)
that fair use interests only users and academics—not content owners.
We disagree.  In a compelling explanation of the importance of shar-
ing information goods with the public (to at least a limited degree),
Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian counsel owners of information goods to
grant limited opportunities to consumers to use parts of their goods
free of charge as a means of increasing their profits.110  In the In-
ternet Era, such uses are widespread, suggesting that many content
owners are following this advice.  Indeed, as Tim Wu has suggested,
many content owners endorse the concept of “tolerated use” by con-
sciously deciding to refrain from enforcing their rights against fan
Thomas Frank, Obama and ‘Regulatory Capture,’ WALL ST. J., June 24, 2009, at A13.  In this
sense, public choice theory suggests a perspective on government regulation more
nuanced than the idea of “regulatory capture,” which often is presented as the core prob-
lem and is remedied by measures to prevent “the revolving door” between industry and
government.
109 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 144–45 (2001).  As to the DMCA, Litman
concluded that its passage constituted “a lot of rent-seeking at the expense of new upstart
industries and the public at large.” Id.  For her earlier study on how public choice pres-
sures shape copyright policy, see generally Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987).
110 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 85–92 (1999).
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sites, believing that “fan sites will increase, not hurt, demand for the
[copyrighted content].”111
Drawing on this insight that content owners confront powerful
incentives to permit fair uses of their copyrighted content, Part II dis-
cusses a number of case studies of content owners who voluntarily de-
sign their protective technologies to allow user privileges above and
beyond what the law requires.  Our survey thus indicates, at the very
least, that in some instances, use privileges for digital content are ro-
bust and are not endangered, as some commentators suggest.  It also
points the way, as we discuss in Part III, for a framework of adaptive
regulation that spurs more content owners to act along the lines de-
picted in Part II.
II
MAPPING THE DIGITAL DOMAIN OF USER PRIVILEGES
In contrast to the claims of some commentators who portray the
marketplace as bereft of opportunities for users to access digital con-
tent in creative ways,112 we identify, using an informal survey, a num-
ber of steps taken by content owners to make content available
relatively cheaply or for free.113  Unlike some courts, we do not believe
that such access arrangements, taken alone, necessarily bar a fair use
claim.114  We do believe, however, that such opportunities are signifi-
cant because they undermine the rationale for a more aggressive re-
sponse to the claimed lack of use opportunities in the digital age.  In
many cases, these measures take the form of authorized “terms of use”
that operate as nonexclusive licenses and explicitly permit uses com-
parable to or even beyond those envisioned by the fair use doctrine.
Our survey reveals that content owners have taken a number of
steps to make available access on reasonable terms and conditions
along two dimensions.  First, some owners or distributors of digital
content have provided flexibility on copies of the digital work to ap-
proximate the rights afforded under fair use.  Second, some owners or
distributors of digital content have made copies of their product ac-
111 Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008).  On Wu’s account,
this form of a “tolerated use” may well be coexistent with “fair use,” but “thanks to the
inherent vagueness in the concept of fair use and the costs of litigation, the contours of fair
use for casual infringement have not been—and may never be—well mapped out.” Id. at
620.
112 See, e.g., Mazzone, supra note 11,  at 398–401. R
113 Obviously, what constitutes reasonably cheap access is open to debate, but our prin-
cipal focus is on terms of access that would not impede new creations.  For a discussion of
the difficulty of gaining permission in the context of creating documentary films, see
Nancy Ramsey, The Secret Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at 13.
114 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 94.  Some commentators have deemed this inquiry R
the “market failure approach to fair use.” See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market
Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 1020 (2002).
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cessible for use in various contexts in a manner that is reasonably
affordable.
Before discussing our informal survey, we would like to empha-
size two points.  First, our aim in surveying the various use privileges
developed in the real world is to complement, not replace, fair use.  In
certain contexts, such as parodies,115 reverse engineering,116 and the
search-engine industry,117 fair use serves an important social purpose;
therefore, it is critical to retain the doctrine.  Second, we concede that
our survey is not sufficiently comprehensive or scientific to conclu-
sively negate concerns about enclosure of content under “digital
locks.”  Nonetheless, our survey indicates that ongoing developments
in the marketplace undermine the gravity of such claims.  In short,
these developments suggest that commentators should more carefully
evaluate what circumstances lead content owners to make their works
available for creative uses.118
A. Opportunities for Multiple Copies of Digital Media
We begin by presenting and discussing real-world cases of con-
tent owners who chose to allow users to create multiple copies of copy-
righted works embedded in digital media.  Traditionally, courts held
that copying a work in its entirety weighs heavily against a fair use
finding.119  Yet, market pressures, as well as the need to address the
challenge of illegal copying, have prompted content owners to ex-
pand use privileges for certain users.  The following cases are indica-
tive of this trend.
1. Apple’s FairPlay
The success of Apple’s iTunes revolutionized the music industry.
During the rise of illegal digital-distribution outlets (e.g., Napster),
the music industry declined to license its content in digital form.
Once Apple entered into contracts with major music companies,
115 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
116 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526–28 (9th Cir. 1992).
117 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007).
118 One possibility is that some parties will grant access to digital content on reasona-
ble terms and conditions so that others can reuse their creations in new ways that create
value for the rightsholder. See supra text accompanying note 110.  Another possibility is R
that the current state of confusion as to the appropriate fair use standard—let alone how it
intersects with the DMCA—creates some incentives for parties to reach marketplace solu-
tions. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1295–96 (1996); see also Burk, supra
note 104, at 139–40 (explaining that vague entitlement standards can encourage parties to R
negotiate a solution).
119 This assertion flows from the third fair use factor, which examines the “amount and
substantiality” of the copied work. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104,
109 (2d Cir. 1998).
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allowing Apple to distribute their music in digital form, it was able to
enter the digital-music marketplace.  The quid for the quo of entry,
however, was that Apple enabled a digital rights management (DRM)
system known as “FairPlay.”120  Under that system, each iTunes user
can authorize only five copies of iTunes at one time but can
deauthorize a copy of an iTunes-purchased song at will.121  The system
also has a huge built-in incentive for individuals to protect access to
their iTunes user names and passwords, as the individuals use the
same user name and password to purchase music from the iTunes
store.122
Subsequent pressures to abandon the implementation of any
DRM system—spurred on by Apple—eclipsed FairPlay’s effort to pro-
vide only limited user privileges.  In 2007, Apple took its first step in
this direction by entering into a contract with EMI Music so that it
could provide EMI’s music without DRM restrictions.123  Apple called
this music the “iTunes Plus” format,124 providing twice the sound
quality of Apple’s DRM-protected music and making the music availa-
ble at the same price as DRM-protected iTunes songs.  More recently,
Apple agreed with other major labels to distribute their music without
DRM restrictions.125  Although Apple had long called for access to
music without DRM restrictions, it merits note that Apple’s progress
on this front followed Amazon’s agreement with major recording
companies to distribute music without DRM restrictions.126
2. Windows Media DRM
Although Apple’s iTunes remains the dominant digital-distribu-
tion platform, its rivals have also sought to offer music in formats that
are not as restrictive as the DMCA would allow.  Windows Media En-
coder, for example, encrypts media files in DRM-protected formats—
specifically, Microsoft’s Windows Media Video (WMV) and Windows
120 See Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, APPLE (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.apple.com/hot
news/thoughtsonmusic/.
121 See About iTunes Store Authorization and Deauthorization, APPLE, http://www.apple.
com/support/itunes/store/ (follow “Authorization” link; then follow “Authorize or
deauthorize your computer” link; then follow “About iTunes Store authorization and
deauthorization” link) (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
122 See iTunes Store: About Apple ID and Password, APPLE, http://support.apple.com/kb/
ht2204 (last modified Aug. 2, 2010).
123 Dan Moren, A Year After iTunes Plus, Apple Faces Stepped-Up Competition, MACWORLD
(May 30, 2008, 2:48 PM), http://www.macworld.com/article/133667/2008/05/stateof
drm.html.
124 iTunes Store: iTunes Plus Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), APPLE, http://sup-
port.apple.com/kb/ht1711 (last modified June 25, 2010).
125 Greg Sandoval, Sources: Apple to Expand DRM-Free Music, Pricing, CNET NEWS (Jan. 5,
2009, 5:05 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10131761-93.html.
126 See Moren, supra note 123. R
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Media Audio (WMA) formats.127  Windows Media DRM, which en-
ables individual consumers to make use of DRM-protected WMV and
WMA files,128 is considerably more complicated than Apple’s FairPlay
system.
Stated simply, Windows Media DRM operates as follows: First, the
content owner must set up an account with a Windows Media license
provider,129 costing between twenty and fifty dollars per month plus a
small start-up fee.130  Second, the content owner is authorized to en-
code his or her content in a DRM-protected file by using Windows
Media Encoder or a similar program.  Third, the content owner dis-
tributes his or her digital media in any manner he or she chooses,
allowing the consumer (by Internet connection) to automatically ac-
quire a license from the license provider.  The principal advantage of
Windows Media DRM is that it is extremely flexible in what terms of
use it makes possible,131 including restricting when users can access
the media, how many times users can play the media, and the number
of times users may copy the media.132  This flexibility means, for ex-
ample, that Windows Media DRM can allow—in addition to a number
of permanent copies—the ability to create “temporary” copies (i.e.,
copies that users can access only at certain times).  By so doing, Win-
dows Media DRM can enable time-shifting, space shifting, and other
activities that likely far exceed the use options that fair use affords.133
Some developers also generated means of using Windows Media
DRM in creative ways.  Consider, for example, the case of MediaKey, a
licensed provider of Windows Media DRM.134  MediaKey has at-
tempted to use DRM as a means of inviting users to try out a service
before paying for the service.  In particular, MediaKey enables content
owners to encrypt a file with apparently harmless DRM and to dis-
127 Expression Encoder Pro 4 FAQ, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/ expression/
products/Encoder_FAQ.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).  Note that Microsoft is phasing
out support for the Windows Media Encoder and is replacing Windows Media Encoder
with the “Expression Encoder,” which provides additional functionality. See Expression En-
coder 4 Overview, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/expression/products/Encoder-
Standard_Overview.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
128 See Windows Media DRM FAQ, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/ windows/
windowsmedia/forpros/drm/faq.aspx (last updated Oct. 2005).
129 Andrea Pruneda, Using Windows Media Encoder to Protect Content, MICROSOFT (Mar.
2003), http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/howto/articles/Protect
Content.aspx.
130 See, e.g., EZDRM DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, http://www.ezdrm.com/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 28, 2010).
131 See Windows Media DRM FAQ, supra note 128. R
132 See id.
133 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–57
(1984) (finding that “time-shifting,” or recording media for viewing at a different time
than it was made available to the public, is a fair use).
134 About MediaKey, MEDIAKEY, http://www.mediakey.com/company.php (last visited
Aug. 28, 2010).
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tribute that file over peer-to-peer networks.135  When a “critical num-
ber” of users have played the file, the hidden DRM clamps down on all
users—thus preventing them from accessing the content—and directs
them to the MediaKey website,136 suggesting the users to purchase a
license to continue using the media.  In short, MediaKey seeks to turn
“piracy” into a tool for market penetration in a manner that some
suggest is consistent with the fair use principle but in all likelihood
goes way beyond uses coming within the aegis of fair use broadly
constructed.137
3. Adobe’s Digital Editions
Another notable use of DRM is Adobe’s Digital Editions (for-
merly known as “eBooks”), which are distributed from the Adobe web-
site.138  Once sold, Adobe makes available books in portable
document format (PDF) and protects them through the use of DRM,
which enables users to access the books only by Adobe Reader.  That
DRM also allows the copyright owner to decide the duration of the
license and whether to allow users to print the work.  Notably, Adobe
only allows users to access a book on “activated” computers.139  To
provide some level of sharing, Adobe allows users to activate up to six
computers, although, unlike Apple’s FairPlay, it does not allow the
deactivation of a computer so as to free up a license.140
4. Spore
As instructive as the efforts to provide for user privileges are as an
initial matter, it is perhaps more instructive to note the pressures that
firms face when they fail to provide such opportunities.  A famous case
of a content owner’s lack of concern over user privileges is the Spore
video game, one of the most-awaited video games of 2008.141  The pre-
mise of the game is that players are able to lead a species from birth as
a single-celled organism to control (by military, religion, or trade) the
known universe.  When first released, consumers quickly criticized
135 Business Scenarios, MEDIAKEY, http://www.mediakey.com/business-scenarios.php
(last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
136 See id.
137 Cf. Brief for Defendant at 5, BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005)
(No. 05-1314), (arguing that “sampling” music, or listening to it for evaluation purposes,
has no significant, negative economic impact).
138 See generally Adobe Reader 7.0: Frequently Asked Questions for Digital Edition Users,
ADOBE, 1 (2005), http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/pdfs/95003923_eBook_FAQ
_UE.pdf.
139 See id. at 2.
140 Id. at 5.
141 See Stephen Johnson, Our Ten Most Awaited Games of 2008, G4TV (Dec. 27, 2007),
http://www.g4tv.com/thefeed/blog/post/681795/Our_Ten_Most_Awaited_Games_Of_
2008.htm.  Maxis developed Spore, and Electronic Arts produced the video game.
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Spore for its severely restrictive DRM, which permitted only three in-
stallations of the game.142  At every installation, the user had to enter a
serial key, and this key was reported to Electronic Arts to subtract one
from the “remaining uses” of that key.  What most angered consumers
was that Spore did not allow keys to be restored by deactivating a
given computer.143  In particular, consumers were concerned that, as
computers need to be reformatted regularly, a user might need to
frequently install a video game where that video game became cor-
rupted.  To put it differently, the user privilege that Spore made possi-
ble was nowhere near “fair” in consumers’ eyes, and consumers
retaliated by posting over 2,500 1-of-5-star reviews of Spore on Ama-
zon.com, virtually all of which focused on its severe DRM.144  As one
critic put it, the nature of Spore’s DRM system meant that Electronic
Arts was in fact “renting” Spore to players for an inevitably limited
time.145
Electronic Arts responded by drastically revising Spore’s DRM sys-
tem.  In particular, it allowed five installations and multiple screen
names per account as well as the ability for users to deauthorize a
given computer to “free up” an installation for another computer.146
Moreover, as a safety valve, Electronic Arts promised that users who
legitimately ran out of installations could contact the company by
phone to renew their serial keys.147  Even with the subsequent reforms
of Spore’s DRM system—to which there are virtually no complaints
(particularly when compared to its predecessor)—Spore continues to
pay a price for its earlier use of restrictive DRM because it suffered
considerable and enduring reputational damage.  Other developers,
however, have learned from Spore’s example: video games like Far Cry
2 and Mass Effect enable a greater number of computers to play the
game and permit users to deauthorize computers to free up previous
installations or to call the producer and request a serial key re-
newal.148  Most notably, the new Chief Executive Officer of Electronic
142 See Stephen Kamizuru, EA Loosens Spore DRM Restrictions, DAILYTECH (Sept. 22,
2008), http://www.dailytech.com/EA+Loosens+Spore‡RM+Restrictions+Promises+Further
+Change/article13014.htm.
143 Cf. id. (stating that changes made to the DRM policy included “[t]he ability to de-
authorize machines and move authorizations to new machines” (italicization omitted)).
144 See Customer Reviews: Spore, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Spore-Mac/
product-reviews/B000FKBCX4 (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
145 Erich Maria Remarque, Dumbed Down Experience and Draconian DRM, AMAZON.COM
(Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.amazon.com/review/RK9RKIUMYF757/ (reviewing Spore).
This review repeatedly emphasizes Spore’s “draconian DRM.”  As of August 28, 2010,
“8,350 of 9,071 people” have found this 1-of-5-star review “helpful.” Id.
146 See Kamizuru, supra note 142. R
147 Cf. id. (“[Electronic Arts] will continue to offer channels to request additional acti-
vations where warranted.” (italicization omitted)).
148 See Andy Chalk, Far Cry 2 DRM Confirmed, THE ESCAPIST (Oct. 15, 2008, 3:39 PM),
http://www.escapistmagazine.com/news/view/86838-Far-Cry-2-DRM-Confirmed; Jay
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\96-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 30 27-OCT-10 11:16
120 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:91
Arts has changed the company’s attitude radically and has embraced
the “freemium” approach, encouraging users to “pirate lots” of its
games “[b]ecause what’s in the middle of the game is an opportunity
to buy stuff.”149
B. Sampling and the Right to Remix
In addition to providing opportunities to access content in flexi-
ble ways (including time shifting and place shifting), user privileges
play a critical role in enabling access to content that others can cre-
atively use.  In particular, as the Supreme Court suggested in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., it is important that users be free to use con-
tent in “transformative” ways.150  Most famously, Lawrence Lessig has
emphasized the growing importance of the “remix” economy and has
highlighted the importance of protecting user privileges in the digital
world through guaranteed access to digital works.151  Lessig’s view
generally assumes that individual content holders decline to make dig-
ital works available and contends that making such content available
for free is the optimal policy strategy.152  As we discuss below, there is
considerable evidence to challenge his view on both scores.
As an initial matter, we concede that Lessig’s concerns are not
unreasonable and that many content owners do not seek to make
their content available in a form that allows for creative uses by con-
sumers.  Notably, many websites have adopted terms of service that
seek to limit the ability to copy their content.  Moreover, as for
software, DVDs, and some CDs, many content owners provide their
media only in encrypted form that consumers cannot access without
violating the DMCA.  That said, we do see encouraging signs of al-
lowing access to content on reasonable terms and, as we discuss in
Part III, we believe that a strategy less aggressive than providing a right
to hack better addresses these restrictions.  In the following sections,
we provide several real-world examples of accommodation by compa-
nies that decided on their own or in response to public pressure to
allow opportunities for the remixing and reusing of their copyrighted
content.
Watamaniuk, Official Bioware/EA Response to DRM Discussion, BIOWARE — MASS EFFECT 2
(May 9, 2008, 6:44 PM), http://masseffect.bioware.com/forums/viewtopic.html?topic=629
059&forum=125.
149 Ben Kuchera, EA’s New Motto: Please Pirate Our Games. . . Er, Storefronts, ARS TECHNICA
(June 23, 2009, 11:07 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2009/06/eas-new-
motto-please-pirate-our-games-er-storefronts.ars.
150 See 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
151 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 68–83, 253–87 (2008).
152 See id. at 254–59.
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1. The Associated Press
Most recently, the Associated Press (AP) created a furor when it
challenged Google’s handling of search requests for its content.153  In
short, AP, which allows online access to its stories under certain
terms,154 wants to ensure it can control and monetize its content.155
To do so, AP mandates users to follow its terms of service that specify,
among other things, that users cannot “copy, reproduce, publish,
transmit, transfer, sell, rent, modify, create derivative works from, dis-
tribute, repost, perform, display, or in any way commercially exploit
the [m]aterials” found on its website without its express permission.156
Moreover, users can obtain that permission by paying a licensing fee
under which a quotation of five to twenty-five words costs $12.50 and
one of twenty-six to fifty words costs $17.50.157  This requirement, if
enforced literally, would abrogate fair use insofar as a five word quota-
tion—almost certainly a fair use under any set of imaginable circum-
stances158—would be the basis for legal action.
Like the Spore case,159 AP’s policies generated considerable con-
troversy and sparked a change in its practice.  Notably, in June 2008,
AP asked Drudge Retort (a blog whose moniker parodies the more well-
known Drudge Report) to remove various quotations from AP stories of
between thirty-nine and seventy-nine words.160  In response, a wide
range of online news and blogging outlets complained that AP was
attempting to interfere with their news reporting and that AP failed to
adhere to the fair use principle.161  The reaction of TechCrunch was
representative of the general trend:
 So here’s our new policy on A.P. stories: they don’t exist.  We
don’t see them, we don’t quote them, we don’t link to them.
They’re banned until they abandon this new strategy, and I en-
courage others to do the same until they back down from these ri-
153 See Dirk Smillie, AP’s Curley Has Fightin’ Words for Google, FORBES.COM (Mar. 30, 2009,
6:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/30/associated-press-google-business-media-
apee.html.
154 See The Associated Press Terms and Conditions of Use, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://
www.ap.org/pages/about/terms.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
155 See Smillie, supra note 153. R
156 See The Associated Press Terms and Conditions of Use, supra note 154. R
157 David Bollier, Associated Press Tramples on Fair Use Rights, ON THE COMMONS (June
18, 2008), http://onthecommons.org/content.php?id=2006.
158 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107(3)–(4) (2006) (listing the “amount and substantiality” of what
was taken from the work and the “effect of the use upon the potential market” as factors in
the fair use analysis).
159 See discussion supra Part II.A.4.
160 Saul Hansell, The Associated Press to Set Guidelines for Using Its Articles in Blogs, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2008, at C7.
161 See id.
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diculous attempts to stop the spread of information around the
Internet.162
In response, AP backed down from its aggressive position, admitting
that its actions were “‘heavy-handed,’”163 promising to “create[ ] a
more thoughtful standard.”164
2. Nintendo’s Super Smash Bros. Brawl
As noted above, almost all software, including video games, uses
restrictive DRM.  One development among video game creators pro-
vides a notable exception to this practice.  In particular, some creators
are allowing increased access to screen shots that users can manipu-
late and share.  In its 2008 release of Super Smash Bros. Brawl, for exam-
ple, Nintendo integrated “snapshot” functionality to the game
itself.165  Consequently, when a player pauses the game in the middle
of a “brawl,” he or she is given the option to move the game “camera,”
change its angle, zoom in or out, and save a snapshot (i.e., “replays” of
up to three minutes) with the tap of a button—all of which users can
access and store on an SD Card.  Indeed, the game manual empha-
sizes that a player can “easily transport” such media and encourages
the player to “transfer data to a friend.”166
As a result of Nintendo’s permissive attitude toward copying copy-
righted content, entire websites dedicated to displaying amusing and
impressive snapshots from Super Smash Bros. Brawl have sprung up.167
Players are increasingly entertaining one another by capturing stills of
preposterously meaningful “scenes” (something the game developers
never would have anticipated or intended to make possible).  For in-
stance, a flexing, warlike figure with an arm upraised might inciden-
tally be standing adjacent to a radiant explosion; adjusting the camera
angle slightly places that radiance behind the warlike figure, which
will now resemble a haloed saint preaching the good word.168  Such
amusing manipulation of media designed by others is exactly the type
162 Michael Arrington, Here’s Our New Policy on A.P. Stories: They’re Banned, TECHCRUNCH
(June 16, 2008), http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/06/16/heres-our-new-policy-on-ap-
stories-theyre-banned/.
163 Hansell, supra note 160. R
164 See id.
165 See NINTENDO, SUPER SMASH BROS. BRAWL: INSTRUCTION BOOKLET 25 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.nintendo.com/consumer/gameslist/manuals/Wii_Super_Smash_Brawl.
pdf.
166 Id.
167 E.g., BRAWL SNAPSHOTS, http://www.brawlsnapshots.com (last visited Aug. 28,
2010).  Notably, many snapshots on this site are available under the Creative Commons
Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported License. See Upload New Screenshots and Stages, BRAWL
SNAPSHOTS, http://www.brawlsnapshots.com/upload (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
168 See Captain Jesus, BRAWL SNAPSHOTS (Sept. 6, 2009, 9:42 AM), http://www.brawlsnap
shots.com/snapshots/60779.
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of “remixing” praised by Lessig.169  This use also illustrates the princi-
ple suggested by Shapiro and Varian: copyright holders can promote
their brand and products effectively by allowing users free access
under certain circumstances.170
3. Copyright Clearing Houses
The final emerging opportunity to access digital content is the
development of rights-clearinghouse services.  Three services bear
mention.  First, under the leadership of Lessig, Creative Commons
has facilitated the emergence of the sharing economy (that Lessig
praises) by enabling content owners to signal their willingness to share
their content on specified terms and conditions that, in many cases,
are amenable to a wide variety of creative uses.171  Second, the Copy-
right Clearance Center has developed a service called RightsLink,
which allows the easy licensing of online content;172 RightsLink man-
ages the order, billing, accounting, and royalties for access to news
services such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Time, USA
Today, and The Economist.173  In short, RightsLink operates as the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) for
the digital journalist.174  In so doing, it mitigates the transaction costs
once inherent in licensing requests and, in some cases, explicitly
grants permission for specific uses of content while clarifying which
uses might cause the content owner to take legal action.  Third,
iCopyright operates in a manner similar to RightsLink, providing
means by which users can share stories with their friends and ensuring
that the relevant advertising is also shared.175
C. The Economic Rationale for Sharing Content
What drives content owners to voluntarily offer user privileges?
Content owners do not grant users access and use privileges out of
altruism or benevolence.  Rather, they do so in response to economic
169 See LESSIG, supra note 151, at 68–83. R
170 See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 110. R
171 For a discussion of the importance of this development, see Robert P. Merges, A
New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 196–200 (2004).
172 See RightsLink, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER, http://www.rightslink.com/over-
view/ (last visited on Aug. 28, 2010).
173 Rightslink-Enabled Publishers, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER, http://www.copyright.
com/viewPage.do?pageCode=rlu5-n (last visited on Aug. 28 2010).
174 For a discussion of ASCAP and its significance, see Merges, supra note 118, at R
1329–40 (“ASCAP, the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, . . . one
of the largest performing rights societies[,] . . . acts as a central depository that allows
members to control public performances of their works.”).
175 See Mike O’Donnell, iCopyright’s Advertiser-Supported Free Uses: What They Mean to
Users, Publishers, and Advertisers, ICOPYRIGHT (Mar. 15, 2006), http://info.icopyright.com/
icopyrights-advertiser-supported-free-uses-what-they-mean-to-users-publishers-and-
advertisers.
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pressures.  In fact, content owners regularly choose to concede certain
portions of their dominion over copyrighted expression out of pure
self-interest.176  In the present context, four kinds of economic pres-
sure have led content owners to adopt the measures discussed in the
preceding sections: customer demands, competition among content
providers, competition from illegal downloading, and the rise of the
creative-commons project and the open-source movement.  We will
discuss each in turn.
As our discussion of the Spore video game demonstrates, cus-
tomer reactions are a powerful motivation for businesses to provide
user privileges.  In a world where the Internet facilitates widespread
dissemination of criticism (in the Spore case, through the Amazon.
com user-based reviews), businesses ignore customer concerns about
DRM at their peril.  By contrast, Apple’s ability to develop a system of
digital-music distribution that largely respected consumer expecta-
tions about user privileges—and its interest in pushing the bounds of
DRM restrictions even further by calling for DRM-free music—helps
explain its success in the digital realm.  Similarly, those who allow ac-
cess to digital content as a means of increasing audience interest—say,
through the use of a copyrighted song in a YouTube video or on a fan
website like “Lostpedia”—will experience marketplace rewards unat-
tainable by content owners that tightly restrict access to their cre-
ations.  More generally, user expectations of receiving such access may
build over time and distill into a powerful social norm that might con-
strain the behavior of content owners interested in restricting use
privileges.177
User concerns are amplified in an environment where firms can
easily adopt the DRM restrictions imposed by their competitors.  Nota-
bly, the competition among content owners is very likely to motivate
some firms to expand user privileges to increase their revenues either
from direct fees or from advertising.  This is especially true in the In-
ternet economy where the volume of users is positively correlated with
revenues and attracting “eyeballs.”  Given that the marginal cost of
reproducing and distributing digital content is close to zero, there is
often a temptation to grant users limited access to digital content as a
176 We do not take our argument that far, but one commentator has argued that this
incentive removes the need for any fair use doctrine in the digital world. See Ben Fernan-
dez, Note, Digital Content Protection and Fair Use: What’s the Use?, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 425, 451 (2005) (“In sum, ‘fair use’ in the digital world will mean an artificially
created set of rights, whereas the ‘fair use’ of the analog world arose out of necessity.”).
177 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 109 (2006) (“Perhaps the single most important precondition for
the adoption of fair use-friendly DRM is neither legal nor technological, but cultural.  The
emergence of a public consensus that DRM should protect fair use, and that a technologi-
cal lockdown of creative works is no longer acceptable, will do much to spur reform.”).
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means of enticing them to purchase additional rights and privileges.
Consequently, where segments of the content industries are highly
concentrated and collusion among firms may suppress the pressure to
compete on providing more consumer-friendly digital rights,178 users
may face additional restrictions.
Yet, even in concentrated industries, user privileges will probably
not disappear from the scene.  First, as illustrated by the Spore and AP
examples, user complaints create a powerful counterweight to a firm’s
autonomy in setting its digital-rights policy.  Second, more liberal
access to content—in some cases, being of the freemium variety—may
enhance the value of the overall product.  Third, content owners must
address the challenge of illegal use of content, and, as others have
noted, that very pressure that finally spurred the music industry to
cooperate with Apple in making available licensed access to digital
music.  By contrast, the effort solely to use “sticks” to protect copy-
righted content—e.g., lawsuits—may even lead to entrenchment on
the part of illegal downloaders and may reinforce social norms of non-
compliance, thereby generating only a very limited deterrent effect.179
Consequently, without “carrots” in the form of use privileges, content
owners will find themselves fighting a losing battle.  Although embed-
ding user privileges in DRM may not save the content industry in the
long run from the threat of digital piracy, the content industry will
probably encourage some users to opt for illegal methods of distribu-
tion by failing to accommodate consumer demands.  Because illegal
use is likely to remain ubiquitous in the foreseeable future, this alter-
native will probably continue to exert pressure on content owners to
offer users opportunities to copy and adapt copyrighted materials.
The final competitive pressure that content owners must address
comes from the creative-commons project and the open-source move-
ment.  The user-friendly licensing platforms that lie at the heart of
these creative groups constitute an important check on the ability of
content owners to offer lopsided terms to users.180  In particular, the
creative-commons project established licensing options that exert con-
siderable influence on all content owners.  Notably, even content own-
178 Coordinated action to curb competition violates the antitrust laws and therefore
runs the risk of heavy penalties when it results from an “agreement”—as opposed to merely
conscious parallel conduct.  See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54
(2007).
179 Compare Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 577 (2006) (discussing how public legal sanctions can affect social norms
and deter violations), with Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case
Against Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1157–58 (2005) (“[P]ushing hard against
the existing norms of [experienced] users backfires and emboldens the preexisting an-
ticopyright norms that enforcement intends to combat.”).
180 See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2010);
OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.org (last visited Aug. 28. 2010).
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ers who do not partake in the creative-commons approach must take
account for the terms that the creative-commons project offers to
users and adjust their own terms accordingly.  Licensing options em-
bedded in the creative-commons project may eventually become an
outlet for the social norms arising from the user expectations we de-
scribed above.  In that sense, they may operate as “sticky defaults”181—
i.e., norms and expectations of users that content owners must cater
to—and thereby shape the terms offered to users in all copyright-re-
lated transactions.
III
THE NEXT STEP FOR DIGITAL COPYRIGHT POLICY
Given the experimentation with user privileges afforded by some
owners and distributors of digital content, the challenge of any regime
designed to advance the purposes of the fair use doctrine is to en-
courage this development while not undermining valuable market-
place experimentation.  In that sense, we agree with Robert Merges’
observation that “private action, and not just government policy, can
augment the public domain.”182  We also endorse the view that gov-
ernment policy can be calibrated to spur—or, “nudge,” as Richard
Thaler and Cass Sunstein have put it183—private actors to take actions
that will facilitate increased access to digital content.  In this spirit, we
recommend that Congress induce content owners to accommodate
user needs by adopting a framework of responsive regulation to aug-
ment competition among content owners over the creation and provi-
sion of user privileges.
We envisage a two-stage regulatory regime.  In the first stage,
Congress would require all owners and distributors of digital content
to endorse a set of user privileges without decreeing the specific con-
tent of those privileges.  In addition, Congress would require content
owners to state clearly what user privileges their terms of use would
afford and would empower the FTC to oversee compliance.  If, and
only if, these measures fail to yield a desirable level of accommoda-
tion, Congress would move to the second stage and increase the regu-
latory burden on content owners by specifying, based on the measures
adopted in stage one, the precise content of the privileges that con-
tent owners must adopt.
181 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On The Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006).
182 Merges, supra note 171, at 184. R
183 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Penguin Books rev. ed. 2009) (2008).
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A. The Principles Underlying Our Proposal
In this subpart, we explain how the case studies in Part II provide
a path forward beyond a focus on reforming the fair use doctrine as
such.  We contend that the measures adopted by content owners to
provide greater freedoms to users are not a fleeting anomaly.  Rather,
such voluntary measures are likely to continue to develop and may
constitute a blueprint for moving beyond the conventional notion of
fair use.  As we explain, the motivations of content owners to offer
user privileges are not likely to disappear in the future.  This does not
mean, however, that we have blind faith in the content industry or
that we are against any form of regulatory intervention.  In fact, the
opposite is true.  Yet, we are strongly of the opinion that before adopt-
ing more intrusive regulation, formalizing a right to hack, or creating
new administrative bodies to engage in expensive review of fair use
claims, it is more advisable and prudent to spur the motivation of in-
dustry participants to afford users freedoms with regard to proprietary
content through a framework of adaptive regulation.  This can be
achieved through two simple measures: first, requiring content own-
ers to adopt and implement a set of user privileges, and second, de-
creeing that content owners conspicuously publicize these
privileges.184
We believe that our proposed regime will provide an impetus for
content owners to come up with reasonable access and use standards
and innovative technological ways of implementing them.185  As we
see it, the privileges that content owners adopt will compete with one
another in the marketplace and, over time, will lead to new use equi-
libria through a process of experimentation.  Requiring content prov-
iders to conspicuously state their access and use policies will reinforce
the competition by notifying both users and other content providers
of other companies’ policies.  In combination, the two prongs of our
scheme will work to facilitate the development of industry-wide stan-
dards, norms, and practices for providing access to digital content
with a menu of different approaches becoming widely available.
184 This aspect of our proposal resembles a suggestion made by Tim Wu, who called on
copyright owners to publicize a list of uses for which they will not bring infringement suits.
See Wu, supra note 111, at 633–34.  A principal difference between his proposal and ours, R
of course, is that our scheme is mandatory and involves a regulatory regime superintended
by the FTC.
185 The need for such a mandated disclosure regime reflects the fact that a famous
theoretical conjecture about product disclosures—that all firms will disclose the quality of
their product, even if it is unfavorable in some fashion, because of an “unraveling” effect
whereby firms will make such disclosures to avoid being perceived as providing a lower
quality product than they really do—does not actually bear out in practice. See Oliver
Board, Competition and Disclosure, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 198 (2009) (“[I]t seems clear that
full disclosure is not forthcoming in practice [absent governmental regulation].”).
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As previously explained, many companies are already developing
opportunities for users to access digital content and use it cre-
atively.186  Many other companies, however, have failed to take those
steps.  As a policy matter, the question is thus whether the case studies
we have highlighted are outliers or are a basis for believing that com-
panies are willing and interested in giving up some control over their
content to allow users to develop the content creatively.  Even if shar-
ing digital content and providing greater user privileges is in the inter-
ests of content owners and distributors, we recognize that not all
content owners and distributors necessarily will actively support fair
uses.  Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons to believe that an
increasing number of content owners will continue to offer various
use privileges in the future.  We now proceed to elaborate on these
reasons.
1. Overcoming the Inertial Force Against Sharing Content
A core public policy rationale for nudging private actors is that
they often fail to respond to an issue out of inertial force (even when
failing to do so is against their self-interest).187  In the analog world,
content owners never had to take any affirmative action to facilitate
fair uses; they merely declined to sue parties using their copyrighted
content.  As such, companies were never forced to engage in self-re-
flection as to the economic value of facilitating fair uses.  In the digital
world, moreover, companies concerned with the threat of piracy have
developed a strong attachment to DRM systems that can protect their
content from being “Napsterized.”  Taken together, the legacy of not
having to afford access to content to facilitate user privileges and the
prevailing perception of the need to implement restrictive DRM sys-
tems to protect content from being copied create an environment
where facilitating user privileges is not a natural concern for content
owners and distributors.
The developing awareness of the rationale for recognizing user
privileges—and the lack of a widespread commitment to doing so—
parallels the state of Internet privacy in the late 1990s.  At that time,
many companies did not think to develop policies that specified what
level of protection, if any, they afforded the data consumers entered
on their websites.  This lack of protection for privacy, as Shapiro
pointed out, was irrational insofar as companies that did not assuage
consumer concerns on this score risked reinforcing the then-emerg-
ing concerns that engaging in electronic commerce would be antithet-
186 See supra Part II.
187 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 183, at 43–44, 103–17. R
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ical to privacy.188  Nonetheless, companies were not quick to embrace
the need for such policies until the FTC highlighted the importance
of the issue.  In particular, the FTC urged service providers to disclose
to their customers relevant terms of service and nudged the industry
to do so by conducting a series of high-profile studies evaluating the
extent of disclosure of Internet privacy policies by e-commerce web-
sites.189  As Peter Swire has reported, those reports spurred a huge
increase in adoption of such policies, with the share of websites post-
ing privacy policies increasing from sixteen percent to eighty-eight
percent over the course of two years.190
The healthy nudge by the FTC in the privacy realm contrasts with
more overbroad action taken by Congress with respect to the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act’s (GLBA) privacy regime.191  Like the FTC’s privacy
initiative, Congress focused on an important policy concern: the fail-
ure of many financial institutions to adopt privacy policies making ex-
plicit how they handled sensitive customer information.  A salutary
benefit of this law was that it required banks to develop privacy poli-
cies on how they handled financial information and gave consumers
the opportunity to opt out of whatever regime the bank adopted for
sharing information.  Significantly, for many financial institutions, the
enactment of GLBA inspired them to undertake the task of determin-
ing what their privacy policy should be.192  In retrospect, however,
Congress made two crucial errors in enacting the law: (1) failing to
provide any guidance or requirement that banks make available the
relevant terms and conditions of their privacy policies in language
consumers could understand; and (2) requiring that the financial in-
stitution regularly mail out the entire privacy policy, which could be as
long as twenty pages.  The two problems are related because the fail-
ure to specify any understandable disclosure terms led the financial
institutions to mail out large policies that consumers were very un-
likely to read or understand.193
188 See Carl Shapiro, Will E-Commerce Erode Liberty?, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 2000, at
189, 198–99 (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)).
189 See generally Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 2041 (2000).
190 PHILIP J. WEISER, EXPLORING SELF REGULATORY STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK MANAGE-
MENT: FLATIRONS SUMMIT ON INFORMATION POLICY 23 (2008), available at http://www.
silicon-flatirons.org/documents/publications/summits/WeiserNetworkManagement. pdf.
191 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006).
192 As Peter Swire explained, this is the critical value of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s
privacy regime. See Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1263, 1264–65 (2002).
193 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of
U.S. Consumer Protection Policy 42–44 (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, George Mason
Univ. Sch. of Law., Paper No. 04-19, 2004), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/
files/ publications/working_papers/04-19.pdf.
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The privacy-disclosure regimes implemented by the FTC and the
GLBA suggest several important principles for the design of the re-
gime we have in mind for providing consumers with user privileges in
the digital world.  First, even where firms may have an economic inter-
est in promoting their consumer-friendly offerings, they may adhere
to old practices (e.g., not adopting a privacy policy or not affording
consumers with express user privileges).  Second, government nudg-
ing—whether the informal strategy used by the FTC with respect to
privacy policies or the formal requirement imposed by the GLBA—
can overcome this inertial force.  Third, for disclosure regimes to be
meaningful and effective, they must ensure that the relevant notices
are understandable.  In the case of online privacy policies, this is often
a concern.  Indeed, on account of the lack of any standardized forms
for disclosure, many policies are almost impossible to understand
without a law degree; some surveys suggest, for example, that only one
percent of high school–educated consumers can understand privacy
policies of large companies.194  By contrast (and as discussed below),
standardized forms for nutritional labeling information provide for
much greater levels of public understanding of the relevant
information.
2. The Importance of Competition and Experimentation
A central premise of our proposal is that a government-standard-
ized or government-mandated form of access to digital content to pro-
mote greater user privileges would, at least at this point in time, be a
mistake.  In principle, a government agency could develop a regula-
tory architecture that would welcome competition and experimenta-
tion either by requiring companies to propose access opportunities to
determine if they are fair or by mandating a specific type of access that
companies could seek a waiver from if they proposed an equally ac-
ceptable alternative.195  Requiring front-end proposals or allowing
back-end waivers, however, would be very resource intensive.  By con-
trast, if companies have an interest in promoting user privileges and
can be nudged to do so, a simple requirement that companies adopt
some digital-rights policy and specify the policy in understandable
terms and conditions might suffice to protect consumers.  Moreover,
given the technological dynamism and uncertainty as to how compa-
194 Louise Story, F.T.C. Takes a Look at Web Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C8.
195 This model is what the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) used in imple-
menting the “broadcast flag” regime, which requires companies accessing over-the-air digi-
tal transmissions to adopt a technology reasonably likely to protect the relevant digital
content. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERI-
CAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 403–05 (2005).  The D.C. Circuit
later invalidated this regime on the ground that the FCC lacked authority to mandate this
requirement. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 704–05 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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nies can provide such opportunities, this approach also has the added
virtue of promoting experimentation that may prove valuable and fa-
cilitate the emergence of alternative standards.196
In the digital rights management context, the FTC is already fo-
cusing on the importance of enhanced consumer disclosure of limita-
tions imposed on digital content.  Notably, the FTC is mindful of the
temptation for businesses to position themselves as providing con-
sumer-friendly content in principle but using loopholes and tactics to
evade such a commitment in practice.  Warning businesses against
such an approach, FTC official Mary Engle explained that “ ‘[i]f your
advertising giveth and your [end user licensing agreement] taketh
away, . . . don’t be surprised if the FTC comes calling.”197  Even if
companies do not use bait-and-switch tactics, companies may still bury
the details of particular DRM schemes.198  The most notably abusive
DRM system was Sony/BMG’s use of a “rootkit” to spy on its customers
without telling them,199 gaining the company a black eye in the mar-
ketplace and an FTC sanction.200  In the wake of that episode, some
commentators have focused on the need for the FTC to be more ac-
tive in this area and to require more effective disclosure of DRM
restrictions.201
To provide consumers with a greater level of awareness as to the
user privileges that digital-information goods provide, we propose a
requirement that a digital-rights policy statement accompany the dis-
tribution of digital products.  To facilitate more effective comparisons
between alternative products, the FTC would be charged with devel-
oping some basic terms and conditions (say, for example, the number
of copies, the opportunity to deauthorize a previous copy, and the
opportunity to remix and use a digital work) that companies would
need to disclose in an understandable fashion.  Companies would not,
196 At present, developers of digital-rights management systems continue to ask differ-
ent questions with considerable debate on what are the right questions. See, e.g., Fred von
Lohmann, Elec. Frontier Found., Reconciling DRM and Fair Use: Preserving Future Fair
Uses? 1 (Apr. 2002) (abstract available at http://www.cfp2002.org/fairuse/lohmann.pdf)
(arguing that developers should ask not “‘tell me what fair use requires, and I’ll built it in’
but rather ‘how can I build something that permits a variety of as-yet unknown uses, so that
courts can decide whether those future uses are fair’”).
197 Nate Anderson, FTC: We’ll “Come Calling” About Deceptive DRM, ARS TECHNICA (Mar.
35, 2009, 4:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/03/ftc-well-come-call-
ing-about-deceptive-drm.ars (quoting FTC Acting Deputy Director Mary Engle).
198 See id. (“While companies rarely lie about what a particular DRM scheme will do,
plenty are willing to bury that information, knowing that consumers won’t be happy about
the limitations.”).
199 See Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have to Give Notice of
Their Use of Technical Protection Measures?, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 41, 52 (2007).
200 See Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, File No.
062-3019, at 5–6 (F.T.C. Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/06230
19/070130agreement0623019.pdf.
201 See, e.g., Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 199, at 69–73. R
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of course, be limited in any respect as to what substantive terms and
conditions they could adopt, and the companies would be free to add
additional information in their disclosure statements.
Three consumer benefits will likely emerge from the FTC’s in-
volvement in our proposed regime.  First, the development of a stan-
dardized disclosure statement will prevent content providers from
trying to obscure their policies or understate their limitations.  Sec-
ond, our proposed system will make it easier for consumers to com-
pare the privileges offered to them by different content providers.
Third, the FTC’s involvement will make the disclosure of digital rights
more credible by convincing consumers that the disclosed policies are
genuine and that the FTC will hold the firms accountable if they do
not follow the policies.
To appreciate the potentially beneficial impact of a government-
mandated disclosure regime, consider the impact of the FDA’s nutri-
tional-labeling regime.  As Ellen Goodman concluded: “It was the reg-
ulation that created a market for nutritional information that now
appears to be strong.”202
In the case of copyrighted content, consumers are interested in
digital works that give them greater levels of freedom.  Nonetheless,
consumers may not readily appreciate how to assess the particular
types of restrictions that are or are not in place, and many firms may
not disclose such limitations in an understandable fashion.  Recall the
Spore example,203  where many consumers likely had to first purchase
the product before realizing that it was unduly restrictive.  Given the
popularity of that game, and the ensuing uproar, the company
changed its stance, thereby protecting those consumers.204  For less
popular products, consumers who are unable to ascertain the relevant
limitations up front are far less likely to benefit from public pressure.
By imposing a labeling regime requiring standardized and under-
standable disclosures of use privileges, our proposal is likely to spur
the types of competition and changes in user behavior witnessed in
case studies like the nutritional labeling context.205
202 Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 139
(2006); see also ARCHON FUNG ET AL., ASH INST. FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE & INNOVA-
TION, HARVARD UNIV., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSPARENCY: WHAT MAKES DISCLOSURE
POLICIES EFFECTIVE? 16–17 (2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
766287 (noting that nutritional labeling requirements “helped [food companies] justify
charging higher prices for healthier foods and helped them improve their corporate
images”).
203 See supra Part II.A.4.
204 See supra text accompanying notes 146–47. R
205 For another example of the impact of nutritional labeling, consider the marketing
of low fat salad dressings before the passage of the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act
(NLEA):
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In addition to providing for a greater level of competition, our
model also encourages technological experimentation.  In the case of
fair use, where the nature of the right itself is intentionally malleable,
encouraging experimentation both in the conception of the privilege
as well as in its implementation in the digital environment is particu-
larly appropriate.  By contrast, approaches that call on the govern-
ment to be active in an early stage of digital content’s development in
setting forth a specific approach risk selecting a suboptimal stan-
dard.206  As an initial matter, asking government officials to play a pre-
scriptive role in setting standards can tax their expertise.  Moreover, as
noted above, such a project may also yield to rent-seeking pressures
and give rise to a standard that would actually restrict—as opposed to
facilitate—competition in this area.
3. Government as Norm Entrepreneur
As we conceive of the FTC’s role in administering our proposed
model, we do not believe that it should function merely as a neutral
party in the face of competition and experimentation on the part of
firms developing user privileges for digital content.  Rather, the FTC
can act—as it did in the privacy context—as a “norm entrepre-
neur.”207  This model envisions the FTC participating actively in the
ongoing discussion about what forms of access are appropriate, seed-
ing suggestions for industry actors to adopt or reject.
As discussed below, norm entrepreneurship can operate effec-
tively in conjunction with self-regulation and is particularly appropri-
ate where a technology is still developing and policymakers are
uncertain as to how it will develop.  For a recent example of this
model, consider former Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
Chair Michael Powell’s embrace of “Internet freedom.”208  In so do-
ing, he commenced the FCC’s oversight of this area by setting forth
Of those firms selling salad dressings with low fat content (6 grams per
serving or lower), all voluntarily disclosed fat information on product la-
bels; of those selling salad dressings with high fat content (13 grams per
serving or more), only 9% chose to disclose.  There can be little doubt that
fat content is a quality characteristic in this market.  Staff at the Food and
Drug Administration and others predicted substantial changes in consumer
behavior following the introduction of mandatory disclosure[,] . . . [and
studies show] that the sales of high-fat salad dressings did indeed decline
after the NLEA was implemented.
Board, supra note 185, at 198 (citation omitted). R
206 For a discussion of the risks inherent in government standard setting, see
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 195, at 239–60, 407–29. R
207 This term appears to stem from Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2030–31 (1996). See also Hetcher, supra note 189, at 2046 (apply- R
ing the term to the FTC in the context of Internet privacy policies).
208 See generally Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the
Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5 (2004).
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“guiding principles” for the industry.  These norms, which emerged
from a series of discussions with firms that developed applications op-
erated on broadband networks, were not mandated, and providers
were free to adopt them or not.  But given the popular appeal of these
principles, almost all industry players chose to adopt them, paving the
way for them to be adopted later as formal legal requirements.209
Had serious concerns about the wisdom or practical feasibility of such
norms emerged, however, the FCC would probably not have later
adopted them.
B. Stage Two: “The Shotgun Behind the Door”
For the reasons we explained, there is strong ground to believe
that companies will respond favorably to a government nudge and
offer user privileges.  Yet, there is also reasonable ground for skepti-
cism.  As we noted, many industry executives grew up without internal-
izing the value of granting additional freedom to users—i.e., they left
users and courts to develop the notion of fair use in the analog world.
More recently, industry executives have adopted an almost single-
minded focus on protecting their content from piracy.  Consequently,
the program we have in mind is likely to be most effective if the con-
tent industry recognizes that the program reflects an opportunity for
the industry to demonstrate its own ability to provide for user privi-
leges in the digital age.
If the competitive forces we described fall short of generating a
socially desirable equilibrium, Congress should be ready to step in
with a more aggressive regime.  At this stage, Congress would pre-
scribe specific accommodations and, again, assign the power to en-
force compliance to the FTC.  Under such a scenario, Congress will
have the important benefit of the experimentation that took place in
stage one of our proposal.  Notably, the information gathered during
that stage will provide Congress with invaluable information about the
range, or menu, of possible accommodations.  More importantly, per-
haps, it will furnish Congress with real-world data about how users re-
sponded to the various privileges they were offered.
If Congress must move to stage two, it will not have to grope in
the dark to develop a set of regulatory requirements.  Rather, it will
have real-world data at its disposal to help it come up with carefully
tailored regulations.  Further, the experience gained in stage one will
make Congress less susceptible to potential misrepresentations by in-
dustry participants as to the feasibility of various user accommoda-
209 The actual adoption of these principles took a somewhat convoluted path: the FCC
originally adopted them as nonbinding principles but later enforced them in an adjudica-
tive context.  For a discussion of these events, see Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet
Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 561–69 (2009).
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tions.  Consequently, any regime that Congress develops will, in all
likelihood, outperform rival proposals that call for an immediate in-
tervention that prescribes behavior by content owners.
Critically, our two-stage design has another virtue: the possibility
of moving to stage two can guarantee success at stage one and, some-
what ironically, obviate the need for a more far-reaching intervention.
If Congress can make a credible threat to intervene should the indus-
try fail to accommodate reasonable user privileges, actual intervention
may not be necessary.  Hence, we recommend that Congress make
clear its intent to intervene if the industry fails to adopt adequate user-
privileges standards on its own.210
The willingness of an industry to regulate itself is often depen-
dent on the belief that there is, as famously put in the securities-regu-
lation context, a “shotgun behind the door.”211  In discussing this
phenomenon, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite explained that
“[r]egulatory agencies will be able to speak more softly when they are
perceived as carrying big sticks.”212  The question in this case is what
sticks the FTC could be perceived as carrying.  After all, a formal re-
quirement to adopt a digital-rights policy—e.g., one that makes clear
the scope of user privileges—does not ensure that such a policy is
reasonable or consistent with existing judicial guidance.  Conse-
quently, in enacting our proposal, we recommend that Congress enact
a parallel requirement that would mandate the FTC to conduct com-
prehensive examinations of digital-rights policies, evaluate the extent
to which they approximate existing fair use jurisprudence, and ex-
amine competing proposals to provide user privileges in the digital
age.213
In implementing such a requirement, the FTC would be well ad-
vised to study the cases we discussed in our informal survey (as well as
210 The European Union adopted a regime that made this threat explicit.  In particu-
lar, Article 6(4) of its Copyright Directive provided that, if content owners fail to provide
for fair use opportunities, member states must take “appropriate measures” to ensure that
rights holders enable lawful users of copyright works.  Council Directive 01/29, art. 6(4),
2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17 (EU).  For a discussion of the merits of this model, see generally
Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 STAN. L. REV. 629 (2008).
211 See Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 764 (1984)
(quotations omitted).
212 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 6 (1992); see also WOLFGANG SCHULZ & THORSTEN HELD, HANS
BREDOW INST. FOR MEDIA RESEARCH, GERMAN FED. COMM’R FOR CULTURAL & MEDIA AFFAIRS,
REGULATED SELF-REGULATION AS A FORM OF MODERN GOVERNMENT B-9 (2001), available at
http://www.humanrights.coe.int/Media/documents/interim-report-sElf-regulation.pdf
(“Even representatives of industry bodies confirmed that self-regulation only works if there
is a threat of state intervention, such as in the shape of industry standards in case of failure
of a code or sanctions imposed on enterprises that have infringed a rule (the so-called
‘heavy stick in the background’).”).
213 These competing proposals would include those discussed supra Part I.
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others) and carefully evaluate their successes and failures.  These
cases will provide the FTC with valuable information about the appro-
priate design of a possible regulatory regime in this context.  Specifi-
cally, the FTC would be able to draw on the various models adopted
by content providers to devise a new regulatory strategy.  Given that
our long experience with fair use has failed to yield a precise defini-
tion of the doctrine (or even a shared understanding), it would be a
herculean task for the FTC to specify a set of rules designed to bind
content owners.  As for any effort to conceptualize the contours of
user privileges, the best way for the FTC to fill the information void is
to rely on practices that emerged in the real world and to use them as
a basis for enacting future regulation should such regulation become
necessary.  As to the effectiveness of its enforcement effort, the FTC
should also evaluate whether its regime is having the intended impact,
and, if not, the FTC could propose that Congress authorize more se-
vere measures in the face of noncompliance.214
CONCLUSION
We are still in the early stages of the digital revolution.  Ten years
after the enactment of the DMCA, however, it is clear that the threat
to user privileges in the digital world is not merely a hypothetical con-
cern.  Nonetheless, even in the face of the heated criticisms of the
DMCA, we believe that the more ambitious reform proposals are pre-
mature and that Congress should enact a less intrusive oversight re-
gime designed to protect and advance user privileges in the digital
age.
The core premise of our proposal is that a series of pressures will
lead content owners to provide consumers with greater use privileges.
To be sure, these pressures are not necessarily inexorable, and we ac-
knowledge that our survey in Part II—which underscores the salutary
impact of such pressures—is only partial and its implications are con-
testable.  Nonetheless, in the face of ambiguous evidence and encour-
aging signs, we believe that our model provides a sounder course for
policymakers.  It allows, to the extent that a nudge and norm entre-
preneurship can suffice, the market to develop strategies for provid-
ing consumers with greater use privileges.  If such means are
ultimately unsuccessful, our proposal will have allowed and en-
214 One such possibility would be the imposition of a “penalty default” of an extremely
lenient toleration of fair use on those firms that failed to adhere to the FTC’s disclosure
requirement.  For a discussion of the role of penalty defaults in changing conduct for the
better and in eliciting socially valuable information, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90–95
(1989).  Such a response is used in other contexts, such as mineral leases, where owners
who fail to file a statement of claim can surrender all preexisting legal rights as a result. See
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 529 (1982).
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couraged the valuable experimentation that will inform the selection
of a more effective interventionist strategy for protecting user privi-
leges in the digital world.
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